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JPRS 81627

25 August 1982

USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1702

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

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CONTENTS

ARMED FORCES

Table of Contents of 'KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL', No 10, May 1982	1
Need for More Effective Komsomol Work Stressed (A. Sorokin; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, May 82)	3
Leningrad Military District Training Procedures Described (I. Fuzhenko; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, May 82)	13
Outline for Indoctrination on Defending the Socialist Homeland (Yu. Osipov; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, May 82)	20
Contents of Military Newspapers Reviewed (I. Bocharov; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, May 82)	34
Personality of the Soviet Officer Discussed (D. Volkogonov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 29 Oct 81)	39

GROUND FORCES

Commander Leningrad MD on Training (M. I. Sorokin Interview; SOVETSKIY VOIN, Jul 81)	46
Night Reconnaissance Training Described (S. Savin; SOVETSKIY VOIN, Sep 81)	52
German Source on Tank Development 1950-1980, Part 2: Suspension Systems (SOLDAT UND TECHNIK, Jun 82)	54

NAVAL FORCES

Table of Contents: 'MORSKOY SBORNIK' Nov 81	64
---	----

ARMED FORCES

TABLE OF CONTENTS OF 'KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL', NO 10, MAY 1982

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 10, May 82 (signed to press 4 May 82) pp 1-2

[Full-text translated articles published in this report are indicated with an asterisk (*); passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] Contents

Lead Article - With the Name of Lenin, Under the Party's Banner.....	3
*A. Sorokin - Increase the Effectiveness of Komsomol Work.....	8
I. Yunak - We Prepare for Military Work.....	17
A. Zhuganov - With the Enthusiasm of the Youth.....	26
B. Khudoleyev - It Has to be Proven...(Features of a Portrait of a Delegate to 19th Komsomol Congress).....	32
A. Koryakin - An Autograph from the Transbaikal.....	38
V. Kalinkin - Hearts Burning with Valor.....	41
From the First to the Nineteenth (Historical Information on Komsomol Congresses).....	47
/60th Anniversary of the USSR/	
The Might of Blood Brotherhood.....	49
P. Norenko - To Each Soldier's Awareness.....	53
V. Kulagin - On a March to High Goals.....	58
/Questions of Training and Military Indoctrination/	
*I. Fuzhenko - Strengthen Planning Discipline.....	64
/For Political Study Group Instructors/	
*Yu. Osipov - V. I. Lenin on the Socialist Homeland and Need for Its Armed Protection.....	70
/On International Themes/	
V. Roshchupkin - A Criminal Partnership (On the Subversive, Terrorist Activities of Israeli and Western Special Services).....	78

/Critique and Bibliography/

P. Gorchakov - Immutable Basis of Soviet Military Organizational Development.....	83
Always on Guard, in Combat Readiness.....	86
*I. Bocharov - Facets of Ideological Influence (Newspaper Review).....	89

/Our Consultations/

V. Bakulin - Active Rest is a Guarantee of Health.....	92
--	----

/In Districts and Fleets/

Way of Life: Soviet * In the Galaxy of Fraternal Republics * As a Friendly Combat Family * "Toward the 60th Anniversary of the USSR's Formation" * Verbal Journal * In the Central Group of Forces * Preparation for Elections * Military Personnel Proceed to the Agitation Point * Raise Party Members' Activeness * Grand Traditions Multiply * Our Work is for You, Homeland! * For the Title of Foremost Subunit * Masters of Training and Indoctrination Share Experience.....	93
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CSO: 1801/291

ARMED FORCES

NEED FOR MORE EFFECTIVE KOMSOMOL WORK STRESSED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 10, May 82 (signed to press 4 May 82) pp 8-16

[Article by Adm A. Sorokin, first deputy chief of Main Political Directorate of Soviet Army and Navy: "Increase the Effectiveness of Komsomol Work"]

[Text] The gaze of all Soviet citizens is turned toward Moscow in these days. The cream of the crop--young workers and kolkhoz members, representatives of the intelligentsia, pupils and students, Army and Navy personnel--have assembled here at the 19th Komsomol Congress to give an account before the party and people for the work of the more than 40 million-strong Komsomol, and to concretize the strategy of their further struggle for implementing Lenin's behests, the historic resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress, and tasks advanced by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the November 1981 Central Committee Plenum, at the 17th Trade Union Congress and at festivities in Tashkent.

When the Komsomol holds its highest meeting we automatically look into its heroic history and pay tribute of deep respect to those generations of youth who fought on the fields of the Civil War, built the foundations of socialism, strode down the fiery roads of the Great Patriotic War, restored that destroyed by the war, plowed the virgin lands, blazed a trail into space, erected new cities and plants, strengthened the defensive capability and vigilantly safeguarded the Motherland's rest.

Soviet citizens of all ages and trades link what is almost the most memorable time in their lives with the Komsomol years. The Komsomol became a genuine school of manhood for more than 145 million citizens of our multinational country. Generations of Komsomol members change, the scope and complexity of Komsomol tasks grow, and work forms and methods improve. And as always, the Komsomol's allegiance to the ideals of communism, its dedication to the party and people and its readiness to continue and develop the grand revolutionary, labor and combat traditions remain stable.

The party highly values the contribution of the League of Young Leninists to the building of a new society, sees a growing role for the Komsomol in communist creation and strengthening of peace, places increasingly high demands on it and shows steady concern for raising the effectiveness and quality of work by all its organizations.

The most important and key element in the Komsomol's work is to help develop a generation of citizens who are politically active, who are knowledgeable, who love work and are able to work, and who always are ready to defend their Motherland. This task, formulated in a spirit of Lenin's behests to the youth and posed for the Komsomol by the 26th CPSU Congress, determines the entire meaning and chief objective of Komsomol life. And there is no higher honor for the Komsomol than to move as quickly as possible to the goals indicated by the party and ensure the political and mental growth of every young Leninist to the level of modern requirements.

The task set by the party for the Leninist Komsomol relates fully to Komsomol organizations of the Soviet Army and Navy. Its special importance is determined by the deep dependence of our security and the combat might and combat readiness of Army and Navy forces on the work of young soldiers. The primary mass of military personnel are made up of Komsomol members. And so the higher the ideological conviction of the Motherland's young defenders, the deeper their understanding of the importance of military work and the more active their position in life, the more reliable is the protection of Soviet citizens' peaceful labor and the great achievements of socialism.

The Leninist Komsomol, including its fighting detachment--the Army and Navy Komsomol--is coping with its tasks successfully under the CPSU's direction. It has to its credit a multitude of important, grand deeds. The Komsomol's sponsorship of military units and ships has become a good tradition. Army and Navy Komsomol organizations perform extensive sponsorship work and military-patriotic indoctrination of the youth. Komsomol members struggle with patriotic enthusiasm, with the enthusiasm of youth, to implement resolutions of the 26th party congress. They are everywhere where fiery hearts, an inquisitive mind, energy and initiative are necessary. Each day the newspapers, radio and television give reports about new successes of young toilers of the Soviet land at the work tool, in the field, in a student auditorium or in military service. We are proud of the military deeds of soldiers who are delegates to the 19th Komsomol Congress. Among them are Heroes of the Soviet Union Maj V. Shcherbakov, Capt S. Kozlov, school cadet MSgt S. Andreyev, a wearer of the Order of Red Star, Gds Sr Smn N. Katsuba, who was awarded the "Combat Merit" medal, and others.

But the party teaches the Komsomol not to rest on its laurels. Lenin said that "the Communist Youth League must be a shock group which gives its help and displays its initiative in any work." This Leninist precept sounds current even today, the more so as there still are many sectors where active Komsomol assistance, businesslike initiative, and initiative calculated for a high result are very necessary. It was noted at the 26th CPSU Congress that it is no secret that some young people's education and state of being informed at times get along with political naivete, and professional preparedness gets along with an insufficiently responsible attitude toward work. This largely is a result of the Komsomol's incomplete work.

It follows that indoctrinational work must be intensified and young people must be accustomed more actively to conscious participation in building communism and defending the achievements of socialism. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized that "it is not so simple to develop such awareness, especially

considering that we are dealing with young people and with characters which have not yet settled. They are ready to respond sincerely and fervently to any good initiatives. But an encounter with formalism or a bureaucratic approach to indoctrinational work quenches the flame of the hearts. It is our task not only to preserve, but to fan this flame."

The strength and inexhaustible source of inspiration for the Komsomol lies in party management of the Komsomol.

Army and Navy political entities and party organizations bear absolute responsibility before the party Central Committee for the status of Komsomol work in units and aboard ships and for the contribution of the Army and Navy Komsomol to the work of training young soldiers. And the more difficult and responsible are the tasks given the Army and Navy Komsomol, the higher the level of party management of Komsomol organizations has to be. It is important for the political entities and party organizations to have good knowledge of the growing demands being placed on the Komsomol, analyze the status of Komsomol work constantly, promptly develop and carry out substantiated party measures for ensuring high activeness and fighting spirit of the Komsomol organizations, and achieve the necessary results.

It is the duty of party members to assist Komsomol organizations in correctly determining the next goals of their work, find the most effective forms and methods of influencing the youth which correspond to conditions and the situation, and show concern for high quality of every Komsomol activity without exception. One cannot lose sight here of questions of increasing the diligence, activeness, initiative and responsibility of Komsomol members.

Political entities and party organizations devote much attention and concern to the life and work of unit and ship Komsomol organizations and are being more and more persistent in striving for concreteness and objectivity of work with the youth. Management of the Komsomol is analyzed and evaluated constantly and objectively at party aktiv meetings and in primary party organizations when examining various problems. Political entities and party organizations often discuss measures for raising the effectiveness of Komsomol work which have been posed directly. Questions of party management of the Komsomol held an important place at the 6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries. Its materials contain abundant experience of party members' work with the youth and a broad complex of measures for increasing party influence on young soldiers. Now it is important to make fuller and more active use of conference recommendations.

There also are many other vivid manifestations of that careful attention with which the youth is surrounded in the Army and Navy. It was reemphasized in the speech by USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov at a Komsomol report-election meeting in a guards motorized rifle regiment of the Taman' Guards Motorized Rifle Division imeni M. I. Kalinin that party members always are ready to help the Komsomol in all its good deeds and initiatives. The youth need such help and the concern of seniors because at times they lack knowledge, life experience and an ability to find correct solutions in difficult situations.

Our party, which is building its many-sided creative work on a genuinely scientific basis, constantly orients the Komsomol on accomplishing ever newer tasks, opens up for the young generation the prospects of grandiose economic, social and cultural transformations, and makes it an active participant in the struggle to fulfill its ideals. Party members in Komsomol ranks are the most immediate conductors of party policy in masses of the youth. They represent the fighting nucleus of Komsomol organizations. The party member in the Komsomol is a person who brings political maturity and party discipline to the youthful environment. It is a person whose way of thinking and acting has a continuous effect on Komsomol members. The strength of this influence is most effective where party organizations place high demands on party members elected to Komsomol entities and create conditions precluding their nonfulfillment; where responsibility for the status of Komsomol work is increased daily in these party members; and where there is comprehensive help in the development of this category of party members as genuine leaders of the youth and where the Komsomol aktiv is trained and indoctrinated in a paternal manner with the realization that this is a very important duty of political entities and party organizations.

Ideological arming of the youth and persuading the youth that no matter what practical or theoretical matter a Komsomol member encounters, Marxism-Leninism is the most reliable means for resolving it, is a subject of primary concern in party members about the Komsomol. We must impart to the heart and mind of every young soldier that only firm, detailed knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory and an ability to apply it in practice makes it possible to take a genuinely creative approach to an analysis of the reality about us, faultlessly determine the chief element in our work, and evaluate our military labor by the only true yardstick--that of the Motherland's security.

Political studies play an important role in the young soldier's ideological conditioning. Commanders, political entities and party organizations must ensure high effectiveness of every political class. It is necessary for every class to teach us, in the words of V. I. Lenin, to act as communism really demands. Much has to be done to this end. The important element is to provide a unity of ideological-political, labor and moral indoctrination in classes on every topic with consideration of the features of group students. Only on this condition is it possible to put an end to the separation of classes from life and from missions being accomplished by the subunit, which occurs in places. In every class the students not only have to understand in detail the essence of particular problems, but also see their own place in their resolution and receive a theoretical charge for shaping the proper attitude toward the object of their work and for increasing the activeness of their work.

And in determining the level of a student's political preparedness we obviously must give fuller consideration to its components and make an objective evaluation of political knowledge, attitude toward military work and activeness of his life position.

It stands to reason that the development of communist ideals and an active position in life in young soldiers depend not only on classes in the system of political training. Planned studies must be linked organically with the

entire ideological indoctrination process and be combined with the active participation of youth in social work. As pointed out in the CC Accountability Report to the 26th party congress, "it is not a question of increasing the number of particular 'measures.' It is a matter of creating a lively, creative atmosphere in every Komsomol organization. It has long been known that truth is assimilated firmly when it has been experienced and not simply taught. And the Komsomol has to build the study of Marxist-Leninist theory so that it merges organically with practical deeds of Komsomol members and with their own lives."

Lenin readings and lessons, thematic evenings, theoretical conferences, Komsomol-youth lecture bureaus and sociopolitical readings entitled "Lenin's cause lives and is victorious" and "Take the example from party members" have become a spiritual need for the personnel of every unit and every ship. One of the vivid reflections of the drive by Army and Navy youth to be worthy of party ideals is its mass participation in the Lenin quiz entitled "Implement 26th CPSU Congress Resolutions!" Being enriched from stage to stage, this has become an effective form of political indoctrination work, accustoming young soldiers to participation in the life of their organization and raising their personal responsibility for high-quality accomplishment of combat and political training missions.

It was noted at the ceremonial session dedicated to the 112th anniversary of Lenin's birth that the secret of Leninism's eternal youth is that Lenin's teaching, principles and ideals are near and understandable to masses of millions and that every generation of people finds in it clear answers to questions troubling them. Herein lies the inexhaustible vitality of Leninism, the strength of our party, which safeguards and constantly enriches Lenin's invaluable heritage.

We must continue to direct the efforts of Komsomol organizations at mastering this great heritage and orient the youth on an ever wider struggle for fulfilling the historic outlines of the 26th party congress and a detailed study of Comrade Brezhnev's works and his "Vospominaniya" [Memoirs], which have become a genuine textbook of life for all Soviet citizens, a textbook instilling fervent love for their Soviet Motherland.

It is important for propaganda of the CPSU CC Decree "On the 60th Anniversary of the USSR's Formation"--this important partywide document orienting the Soviet people and Army and Navy personnel on shock work and exemplary service in honor of the upcoming jubilee--to broaden in the youth collectives from day to day.

We must not forget about developing a burning hatred for imperialism and for bourgeois ideology and its morality in the young soldiers as we accomplish such an important task as shaping a communist outlook and allegiance to the military oath. The question today is this alone: There can be no place in the military environment for political immaturity, naivete, or instances of a loss of class feeling. The contemporary world situation is acute, complex and contradictory. It gives rise to alarm over the further development of international relations and the life of all mankind. Under these conditions, where the danger of war has risen sharply through the fault of NATO and above all

the U.S. administration and Beijing accomplices of imperialism, party and Komsomol organizations are faced with an even more pressing task of exposing in a well-reasoned manner the aggressive essence of the ideology and politics of imperialism and Maoism, consistently defending our class positions, and developing high political and military vigilance in the soldier masses.

The party teaches us that concrete matters are a measure of the masses' political indoctrination. Communist ideology is an alloy of knowledge, conviction and practical action. For our military personnel the perfection of military proficiency and an increase in combat readiness of Army and Navy forces represent such action. Frankly speaking, the young lad called up for military service is faced with very difficult tasks. In a relatively short period of time he has to master the most up-to-date technical systems, practice tactical movements to automatism and prepare himself morally, psychologically and physically for actions in a real combat situation. It is clear that the soldier's development takes place faster where combat training is well organized. Precise planning, the necessary logistical support, high methods training of the command and engineer personnel, and a general atmosphere of intolerance of any kind of oversimplifications or indulgences--this is everything that permits making the field and classroom activities, tactical exercises, ocean deployments, flights, firings and missile launches a genuine school of the personnel's moral-combat conditioning. The supreme task in the work of shaping both the military proficiency and high morale of military personnel is to attain the highest level of organization of combat training.

It is difficult to overestimate the role of party organizations here. They only have to let up in their influence on improving the combat training process and immediately there is a drop in the indoctrinational effect of classes, drills, exercises and practices, and the party members narrow their opportunities to exert a vigorous and comprehensive influence on the development of necessary political and moral-combat qualities in young soldiers. And to the contrary, where constant party attention is given to precise organization of the training process, there it is usually enormously easier also to achieve the Komsomol organizations' activeness in the struggle to perfect the personnel's combat schooling, and there the personnel display excellent preparedness for conducting modern combat.

The result of Exercise "Zapad-81" is graphic proof of this. Two-thirds of its participants were made up of Komsomol members. It was the high schooling and ability to master the formidable modern equipment multiplied by the people's selflessness that helped successfully accomplish all operational-tactical missions. We arrive at the very same conclusion when we analyze results of the winter training period. Komsomol members' mass creative participation in mastering tactical movements, equipment and weaponry and improving the training facility is seen most clearly in foremost military collectives. I would like to take note of the latter in particular.

The youth responds most willingly to appeals of senior comrades when they are given concrete things to do. In the interests of combat training it is important to arouse and lead Komsomol members on a campaign for technical knowledge, for the Army and Navy constantly are being outfitted with the latest equipment and weapons. This means life itself places the personnel face to

face with the task of studying hardware thoroughly, being able to operate it competently and being able to employ it in combat expertly. The interests of the matter demand that indoctrinational work be conducted so as to elevate even more the responsibility of Komsomol members and all young soldiers for expert mastery of equipment and weapons. We must comprehensively improve competitive reviews of Komsomol organizations for the best and most detailed technical knowledge, popularize the experience of masters and demand a strict accounting of those who work half-heartedly.

One of the most effective forms for including Komsomol members in active independent work is their participation in the mass youth movement known as "Komsomol concern for the training facility." Here, with appropriate support of senior comrades, they have to accomplish tasks of an exploratory nature which develop a feeling of collectivism and encourage scientific-technical creativeness.

And socialist competition of course opens up the broadest opportunities for unfolding youthful initiative. In its spirit and dynamism it fully corresponds to the Komsomol character. Publicity and comparability of results, an opportunity for practical repetition of experience, and comradely mutual help in competition truly can work wonders. But competition acquires wings only if it is carefully organized and devoid of formalism and if the demands of its principles are observed steadfastly. This is a very important factor which party members cannot and must not fail to consider in daily practice. The capabilities of competition were displayed with special vigor during the Leninist Communist Saturday Workday.

In the Decree "On the 60th Anniversary of the USSR's Formation," the party Central Committee sounded a call for a persistent increase in the level of the entire organization of competition and concentration of primary attention on raising the effectiveness and quality of work and attaining high end results.

Socialist competition begun in the current training year has become a genuine test and broad review of the energy and capabilities of Army and Navy youth. Its motto, "Reliable protection for the peaceful labor of the Soviet people!" calls competitors to new and higher goals. Commanders, political workers, party organizations and their combat assistant, the Komsomol, are called upon to maintain in every way possible the high intensity of competitiveness, which contributes to a further strengthening of the USSR Armed Forces combat potential.

It is thanks to their joint, concerted efforts that successes in competition are multiplying. Foremost experience is becoming a property of ever wider masses of military personnel. Speaking of youth affairs, one could say that the chief sign of our times are such Komsomol initiatives as "An excellent result for every pregress day!", "Not one laggard nearby," "Master all organic weapons of the subunit," "Function at night under daytime norms," "Hit the target with the first round or first missile launch" and others. These concise, precise mottos reflect the activeness of Komsomol members in the military and their desire to do as much as possible and as best they can in the assigned sector and lead colleagues to attain new heights of combat improvement.

A few months ago the movement of Army and Navy youth for the right to sign the Armed Forces Komsomol members' report to the 19th Komsomol Congress made its start. It perceptibly filled the life and combat training of the youth with a new charge of healthy rivalry. The signatures of tens of thousands of privates, seamen, sergeants, petty officers, and young warrant officers and officers today are on this report--a document certifying the young soldiers' zeal, purposefulness and readiness for selfless work and for exploits in the name of the Motherland's security.

Competition for a worthy greeting to the Komsomol forum gave the following figures: Every third military Komsomol member achieved the title of outstanding in combat and political training; over 80 percent of Komsomol members became rated specialists; and 85 percent became ranking athletes and VSK [military sports complex] badge wearers. We could give tens, hundreds of addresses where entire Komsomol collectives merit the highest praise. Tank regiment "X" has held the title of outstanding for ten years, personnel of one of the aviation units have not conceded foremost positions for five years, and the submarine "Ul'yanovskiy Komsomolets" has won the title of outstanding 14 times in a row. Such constancy of high results became possible thanks to the ability of commanders, political entities and party organizations to orient the personnel on attaining concrete goals and to create an atmosphere of collectivism, comradeship and genuine creativeness in Komsomol organizations. An especially great role is played here by those party members who are working directly in Komsomol organizations. They include Capt S. Malikov, Sr Lt P. Bruskov, Sr Lt A. Mozgovoy, Lt A. Mamontov, Petty Officer 1st Class V. Trotsenko and many others.

It is the experience of foremost military collectives that attests convincingly to how great the influence of Komsomol activists may be on the progress of socialist competition. Along with a generalization and wide dissemination of foremost experience of the best specialists, they are called upon to exercise daily concern for adjusting comradely mutual help and the sponsorship of novices by recognized masters, demand a strict accounting of those who drag the military collective backward or mark time, and make a regular practice to hear accounts of Komsomol members at meetings and sessions of the bureau or Komsomol committee. The arsenal of forms and methods of indoctrinational work with the youth is truly inexhaustible if we take an approach toward our duties that is imaginative and with a sense of high responsibility. Only on this condition is it possible today to be on top of party demands and the demands of the time.

Successes in military activities and socialist competition and a forward movement are inconceivable without strict, precise observance of the order and rules established by Soviet laws and military regulations. Discipline comprises the chief content of military personnel's work and the basis of combat readiness. Therefore the struggle for conscientious, truly firm military discipline and for the example in discipline of every Komsomol member is the primary task of Komsomol organizations.

It is possible to achieve the strict, precise observance of order and rules by every young soldier, and this is achieved, where constant concern is shown for people's understanding of the meaning of discipline and its vital necessity,

for a firm knowledge of those demands and rules which are to be followed, for a healthy atmosphere in the collective, and for strict regulation order of the personnel's service, everyday life and leisure. There is a place for Komsomol organizations to lend a hand in the matter of strengthening discipline, and this is an extremely concrete matter. It is important here to arouse the youth, formulate goals for every subunit, help allocate forces and constantly expand the ranks of active fighters for the requisite level of the personnel's conduct and work.

It is the Komsomol activists who have daily responsibility for high effectiveness of Komsomol assistance to the commander in strengthening discipline in the subunit, unit and ship. But here too there still are weak points. Komsomol activists do not always have a clear picture of their role in this important matter everywhere, nor are they able to reach every person with every activity. Moreover, there still are frequent instances where there is a formal discussion at youth activities about the soldier's duty and honor which affects no one. Komsomol organizations in some areas have forgotten the indoctrinational importance of the moral code of a builder of communism, poorly explain the deep meaning of its principles and do not conduct a truly persistent struggle for implementing the requirements contained therein. The efforts spent in this approach are ineffective.

Discipline is higher where the collective is more cohesive and where every soldier subordinates his personal aspirations to attainment of the overall objective. Possessing enormous indoctrinational force, Army and Navy collectives have a beneficial effect on development of the best personality traits. It is here, in an atmosphere of general interest, mutual respect and trust, exactingness and principle, in an atmosphere in which it is easy to breathe and work well, that high moral-combat and political qualities are polished and tempered and relations of friendship and troop comradeship are formed. Concern for creating a healthy moral climate in military collectives is both a party and a Komsomol concern.

The initiative "Komsomol concern and attention for the young generation" is very useful from this standpoint, for example. If it is filled with concrete content and truly creative, diversified work, this will open up great opportunities for creating a high moral-combat mood in the novices from the very first days of service and instilling love for their unit and a feeling of pride for belonging to the Soviet Armed Forces. Matters must be arranged in the Komsomol organization so that all indoctrinational measures assist the young soldier in perceiving the deep meaning of his military labor.

Today's enlisted men's barracks or the ship is a military home where the roads of young emissaries of union and autonomous republics and of various krais and oblasts have come together. The present military subunit personifies the great brotherhood of people of labor who have an inherent feeling of being a unified family and our inherent, truly Soviet understanding of the friendship of nations. During active preparations for the 60th anniversary of the USSR political entities and party and Komsomol organizations have to explain graphically and persuasively to the personnel the essence of Lenin's policy of nationalities, its enormous achievements over the years of Soviet power, and the great defensive importance of the USSR's formation. There is

inexhaustible material here in the hands of activists. They only have to use it capably. They have to show our reality through understandable and intelligible facts and examples in such a way that the idea of the great, indestructible force of the social-political and ideological unity of Soviet nations is deeply set in the young person's awareness. Through the personnel's perception of these high truths we must proceed to accomplishing the important task of making military collectives even more cohesive.

Examples of high discipline and of faithful, honest service to the homeland and the examples of troop comradeship and fraternal friendship of the soldiers of different nationalities also are presented generously to Komsomol activists by our Motherland's heroic past, and especially by the Great Patriotic War years.

During the period 1982-1984 there will be a celebration of the 40th anniversary of a number of outstanding victories by Soviet forces over the fascist invaders. These jubilees create a good opportunity to hone the attention of young soldiers on the heroism and selflessness displayed by sons and daughters of all nations of our country in the enemy's defeat at Stalingrad, in battles in the Kursk Bulge, for the Dnepr and for the liberation of Kiev, in liberating Leningrad from the blockade, and the liberation of Belorussia, Lithuania, Moldavia, Estonia, Latvia and the Ukraine; as well as to hone their attention on exploits of city-heroes. The 40th anniversary of the Soviet Union's Great Victory over fascist Germany will be celebrated in 1985. The preparation and conduct of celebrations of the 40th anniversaries of outstanding victories must contribute to a reinforcement of soldiers' indoctrination, especially young soldiers, in a spirit of Soviet patriotism, socialist internationalism, and constant readiness to defend the Motherland and the great achievements of socialism.

In bringing up the youth on examples of frontline courage and brotherhood sealed in blood, activists not only have to familiarize young soldiers with the heroics of the Great Patriotic War, but also reveal the moral strength of the exploits of their predecessors and orient them on augmenting the remarkable traditions and on attaining high indicators in service, combat training and mastery of sophisticated equipment. As a heritage of older generations Komsomol members are called upon to take up more and more fully a high class feeling and unremitting political vigilance. That must be the result every time the youth turns to the heroic past.

In assisting the commander, political worker and party members in training and indoctrinating military personnel, developing their love for equipment and weapons, and conditioning the youth comprehensively, every Komsomol organization must see the main goal as being the further elevation of combat readiness of their subunit, unit or ship and, in the final account, combat readiness of the Armed Forces. Komsomol members are called upon to place a large reserve of energy and knowledge, youthful enthusiasm and indomitable spirit into the attainment of this goal. It is the duty of political entities and party organizations of the Army and Navy to build up the Komsomol potential and ensure its maximum use in the interests of defending the achievements of socialism.

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ARMED FORCES

LENINGRAD MILITARY DISTRICT TRAINING PROCEDURES DESCRIBED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 10, May 82 (signed to press 4 May 82) pp 64-69

[Article by Maj Gen I. Fuzhenko, first deputy chief of staff of the Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District: "Strengthen Planning Discipline"]

[Text] The Communist Party always attached and continues to attach enormous significance to the planned development of the country's national economy as a natural pattern and advantage of socialism. At the 26th CPSU Congress Comrade L. I. Brezhnev worded extremely comprehensively and precisely the demands placed on planning and on accomplishment of plans under present-day conditions. "A plan is law because only its observance assures cohesive work. . . . The time obviously has come to place more rigid demands both on planning discipline and on the quality of plans themselves," said the CPSU CC general secretary. "A plan unquestionably has to be realistic and balanced. But it is just as unquestionable that it has to be fulfilled as well." The November 1981 CPSU CC Plenum reemphasized that after approval, a plan becomes the law of our life and work and that everyone, from the worker to the minister, is obligated to regard it specifically as law.

These party demands also relate fully and wholly to the vital activity of military collectives. The planning of combat and political training, scientifically grounded and accomplished in conformity with these demands and with orders and directives of the USSR minister of defense, and the struggle for complete and high-quality fulfillment of plans make up the heart of management of the training and indoctrination process, the basis for raising the intensity and effectiveness of the personnel's military labor and for strengthening the combat readiness of units and subunits.

As a document of great organizing and mobilizing force, the plan permits coordination of the work by commanders, political entities, staffs, the party and Komsomol organizations, and all personnel, directing it to the attainment of concrete, important goals in operational, combat and political training, and giving precision and cohesiveness to the many-sided, complex work of any Army collective. A plan disciplines people, prompts them to work purposefully and permits us to see the long range. Troop practice constantly provides sufficient proof that more ponderable and stable successes naturally are achieved in the perfection of combat expertise and troop field and tactical weapons schooling specifically in those units and subunits where training and

indoctrination planning is better arranged and planning discipline is stronger.

In implementing party demands, the USSR minister of defense and the Leningrad Military District military council, political directorate and staff give constant attention to improving combat and political training planning and the strengthening of planning discipline. In military council sessions these two tasks usually are examined in inseparable unity inasmuch as they are closely interrelated and the qualitative level of accomplishment of the former largely predetermines successful accomplishment of the latter. For it would appear to be clear to each person that practical implementation of the plan depends to a considerable extent on how optimum and realistic it is and how deeply it is perceived by military personnel as a state assignment from which there can be no deviation.

Simply speaking, planning discipline consists of seeing that everything planned is accomplished on a mandatory basis, exactly at the times designated by orders and instructions of the commanders, and in the best manner. In the general sense of the word it is inseparable from the concept of military discipline based on the servicemen's thorough understanding of their duty and personal responsibility for reliable protection of the Motherland, and on strict observance of the order and rules established by Soviet laws and military regulations. The foundation of planning discipline as well as of military discipline in general consequently consists of ideological-political maturity, conscientious execution and a sense of high personal responsibility for an assigned job. The formation and development of these qualities in officers and all personnel require the joint, purposeful efforts of commanders, political entities, staffs, and the party and Komsomol organizations.

It must be said that indoctrinational and organizational work being performed in district troop units facilitates establishment of the personnel's proper understanding of party requirements and of a responsible attitude toward fulfilling combat and political training plans. During the winter training period personnel of many units took a step forward in perfecting combat proficiency. Personnel of the unit commanded by Gds Lt Col A. Obukhov and of other foremost military collectives deserve a good word in this respect.

We know that a primary role is given to the commander in strengthening planning discipline just as in resolving all other matters involving the maintenance of high combat readiness in a unit. Being the organizer of the training and indoctrination process and possessing absolute authority, he is called upon to be the implementer of party lines and USSR minister of defense instructions and, together with his deputies, the staff, and chiefs of combat arms and services and relying on the party organization, to ensure well conceived planning of combat and political training and the strict fulfillment of plans outlined. His subordinates' attitude toward work, their execution, and the results of the military labor of the military collective as a whole depends on his good management and exactingness and on how thoroughly and demandingly he exercises control.

Based on this, the district military council, political directorate and staff show constant concern for raising the professional training, competency and

responsibility, for developing organizational abilities and for improving the work style of unit and combined unit commanders. The work experience of foremost commanders who achieve complete and good-quality fulfillment of training plans is discussed thoroughly, and omissions and mistakes in the work of those officers who were not able to ensure high planning discipline are analyzed at military council sessions as well as when combat and political training results are summarized for the month and the training period. Demands of the party and USSR minister of defense for improvement in planning work, and instructions of the CIC of the Ground Forces were studied at a course for command personnel held before the beginning of the training year. The principles, methods and experience of scientific planning with consideration of the nature of modern combat and the recommendations of military science, pedagogics and psychology are examined in the process of command training with leaders of units and combined units. It stands to reason that none of this goes by without leaving a trace. Many commanders and staff officers have begun to take a more responsible attitude both toward elaborating plans and checking their execution, and they have mastered the ability to make plans optimum and at the same time realistic on the basis of a precise calculation taken down to a concrete assignment and a precise class schedule for a specific period of time.

This is inherent in particular to Gds Lt Col Obukhov, commander of the guards motorized rifle training regiment. He personally handles the planning of combat training and does not shift the important job to his assistants' shoulders, as unfortunately still happens at times in places.

For example, before drawing up the combat and political training plan for the winter training period the commander held a special class with officers of the regimental staff and headquarters and all subunit commanders at which they went over requirements of guidance documents and analyzed shortcomings of last year which led to interruptions in training. Gds Lt Col Obukhov assigned the officers precise tasks: to place emphasis in plans on the personnel's field and tactical weapons schooling and on more rational use of training time, the training facility, engine resources, ammunition and other supplies; to provide for integration of classes; to coordinate the primary training activities outlined in plans of the regiment and battalion; and to preclude parallelism, overlaps and discrepancies.

After receiving exhaustive instructions and after discussing and clarifying all organizational matters, the regimental chief of staff and deputy commanders drew up a realistic combat and political training plan together with chiefs of combat arms and services, with consideration of the personnel's level of training and the subunits' tactical teamwork. Approved by the commander, this plan became a starting basis for arranging intensive training and for the strenuous military work of personnel, and on the whole it was fulfilled successfully.

Mention also should be made here of three positive points contributing to a strengthening of planning discipline in this unit. The commander and regimental staff objectively manage the planning of training in the battalions for the month and compilation of company class schedules, and they exercise strict supervision over fulfillment of everything planned. The deputy

regimental commander and deputy battalion commanders for political affairs contribute to precise coordination of operational training and ideological indoctrination matters while participating in the planning and arrange party-political work in close contact with the missions being accomplished by the personnel. Commanders and political officers use joint efforts to direct the personnel's competition above all at high-quality implementation of training programs. In short, they remember here that the best plans may remain good intentions on paper if people are not mobilized and inspired for implementing them.

Unfortunately some commanders and staff officers still lack this approach. For this reason the planning of combat training still is being accomplished in an unreasoned manner at times, without consideration for specific features of tasks being performed. Plans do not always provide for integrated resolution of training and indoctrination matters or an improvement in tactical proficiency in an inseparable unity with the personnel's moral-political and psychological conditioning. Coordination of different combat arms at times is not planned or implemented in practice in the best manner. There are instances where training activities are coordinated insufficiently by time, place and logistical support, the methods sequence of training is interrupted, and little time is set aside for night classes and preparing personnel for actions under special conditions: in the mountains, forest, a populated point and so on.

Mistakes in planning inevitably hinder a precise interlocking of training activities, lead to disruptions in the training and indoctrination process and in the final account reduce its quality. In summarizing results of the winter training period, the military council sharpened the attention of the district staff and directorates and of the command-political personnel of units and combined units on the need for resolutely doing away with deficiencies and bringing planning and planning discipline into full conformity with demands of the party and the USSR minister of defense. Political entities oriented primary party organizations, and staff organizations above all, on the resolution of this problem.

The status of planning discipline is predetermined to a considerable extent by the level of organizational and indoctrinational work of commanders, political entities, staffs and party organizations. A plan is implemented by people's daily work. Consequently, it is important to instil a high sense of responsibility above all in the immediate organizers and directors of combat training--the officers, warrant officers and NCO's--and arm them with methods proficiency and the ability to get the maximum return from every problem and exercise. It is no less important to dispose all military personnel toward conscientious labor. It is impossible to ignore the circumstance that demands now have risen on the scope of the personnel's knowledge and skills, while the time for acquiring them has been cut. By increasing the intensity of the training process through integration of various combat training subjects with tactics, we increase the physical stress on people, not to mention the fact that the very nature of modern combat demands great physical and nervous stress, a full application of effort and energy of servicemen.

Organizational and indoctrinational work is performed more objectively and produces positive results in those military collectives where all this is taken into account. For example, that is how things stand in the unit in which Gds Maj A. Dudkin serves. The command training of officers and ideological-political conditioning of all categories of personnel here are rather well arranged through the common efforts of the commander, political officer, staff specialists and party committee members. The unit makes extensive use of instructional methods and demonstration classes, independent preparation on individual plan-assignments, an exchange of experience, and businesslike assistance by senior comrades to junior comrades for raising the officers' methods proficiency. While working in the subunits, staff officers and chiefs of services teach young commanders the methods of effective organization of classes, exercises and practices.

At one time a lag in fulfilling the combat training plan and a sharp drop in qualitative indicators of training were noted in the reconnaissance company. Staff officers and party committee members looked into the reasons for such a poor state of affairs and helped correct it. The reason was that young officers who arrived in the company did not have sufficient experience in preparing and conducting classes, often allowed indulgences and oversimplification, and at times kept the personnel from what was in their view superfluous physical loads, to the detriment of the work. Company party members had relaxed their influence on the personnel and did not speak out with principle against the omissions. Staff officers and party committee members had to work more than a few days here to eliminate the deficiencies once and for all, but their work was not in vain. In a few months the company moved into the ranks of foremost.

A struggle for planning discipline has to be objective. Many fervent words and appeals were uttered about the need for assuring precise organization of the training process and high execution at service conferences and party meetings in the unit where Officer A. Kovtun serves. In fact, however, there was a lag in plan fulfillment during the winter training period through the fault of those very persons who uttered these appeals. It stands to reason that they had to make up for lost time to the detriment of the quality of other training activities. In general, each time one encounters instances of inefficiency, lack of execution or disruptions in training, one sees that they appear where proper exactingness and supervision are lacking on the part of senior commanders and the officers of staffs and directorates. For example, guards senior lieutenants A. Kharchikov and V. Litvinenko wasted much valuable time to no purpose in a tactical exercise because they had prepared poorly for it. But the battalion commander and staff officers were obligated to check their preparedness. Since they had not done this, this means they had not been accustomed to punctual performance of official duty by the regimental commander and the party organizations were not placing proper demands on the party members. This is the kind of logical sequence that is formed!

There can be no question of high planning discipline without systematic supervision or a well arranged check of execution. The party teaches us to view the check of execution as a most important part of organizational work. This means that it cannot be reduced to a simple collection of data or identification and recording of deficiencies. Genuine supervision assumes above all a

detailed study and objective analysis of the state of affairs and practical assistance given on the spot in remedying deficiencies and omissions. It has to have a principled, objective and demanding character so that people constantly feel a sense of responsibility for the assigned job.

It must be said that changes for the better both in the work of generals and officers of the district staff and directorate and in many units have been seen of late in the check of execution. Supervision is being accomplished in a more system-oriented and qualified manner, and its effect on strengthening planning discipline is becoming more perceptible. This is facilitated first of all by the fact that commanders and supervisors precisely determine the objective, content, procedure and methods of checks, thoroughly brief those who are assigned to conduct them, and go over with them the requirements of guidance documents; and secondly, by the increased influence of party organizations on the work style of party members who are officers of staffs and directorates.

I will refer in particular to the primary party organization of the district combat training and military educational institutions directorate. It actively assists the directorate chief to develop officers' efficiency, responsibility, principle, execution and imaginative initiative. Party meetings here repeatedly discussed questions of the party members' mastery of a Leninist work style, a style that is lively, creative and imbued with a scientific approach to matters, which does not accept subjectivism and self-complacency, and which opposes any manifestations of bureaucratism and formalism. Before officer-party members travel to troop units party bureau secretary Col N. Doynikov chats with each of them, orients them on high-quality performance of the official assignment and provides a concrete party task. After the officers return from TDY the party bureau usually hears reports from the party members about the work they did. It stands to reason that all this is of benefit to the people and the common cause.

While working in units directorate officers do not act as impassive recorders of deficiencies, but as active organizers of an effective training process and champions of foremost experience. They act with principle against indulgences and oversimplifications in training and against the attempt by some leaders to fulfill the training plan at any cost. For example, while in one of the regiments, officers N. Doynikov, V. Kuznetsov, F. Volkovitskiy and others uncovered the fact that a planned battalion tactical field fire exercise had not been prepared properly and recommended that the commander put it off. Shortcomings in organization and preparation of the exercise were remedied with their help in a short period of time. As a result it took place in a situation approximating combat reality to the maximum and with benefit to an increase in the personnel's field and tactical weapons schooling.

Many such examples can be given, but at the same time it should be admitted that the problem of raising the quality and effectiveness of supervision still remains and much work has to be done to resolve it. The check of execution at times bears a superficial character and is limited to concern merely with seeing that training activities are conducted on time, without a detailed study of their content or the extent to which they meet the fundamental principle of teaching troops what will be needed in war or what the degree of influence of

these activities is on reinforcement of the unit or subunit combat readiness. And so it sometimes happens that classes and exercises prescribed by the plan are conducted and gaps in the weapons or tactical training of certain soldiers are uncovered in the final check. That happened once, for example, in the unit in which Maj Yu. Novoselov serves. But officers of the district staff and directorate and of the combined unit had been here, although, as they say, they had not seen the forest for the trees. Consequently party organizations of this unit and the staff party organizations have not yet developed in all officer-party members a high principle, irreconcilability toward shortcomings, or the ability to delve deeply into the state of affairs.

Socialist competition in honor of the 60th anniversary of the USSR's formation is an important means for reinforcing planning discipline, since the entire content of soldiers' pledges is aimed at successful implementation of training plans and programs. The people's enthusiasm and creative initiative, if used skillfully, unquestionably contribute to increased intensification of the training process and an improvement in its quality. In my view there is special value in such patriotic initiatives as a struggle to conduct tactical field fire exercises for a grade of outstanding, for hitting targets at maximum ranges with the first round, and for a reduction in time of making units and subunits combat ready.

The difficult and responsible tasks of the summer training period which lead us, figuratively speaking, to the final straightaway in preparing for the grand jubilee of the USSR, obligate commanders, political workers, staff and directorate officers, and district party organizations to work better, to work more effectively and to be more persistent in implementing the party's instruction on placing more rigid demands on the quality of plans and planning discipline. With consideration of experience already gained and deficiencies which have occurred, we must strive for a further elevation in the scientific level of planning of all aspects of troop activity, improving its methodology, and instilling in every general, officer, warrant officer, NCO and private a heightened sense of responsibility for full and unconditional performance of missions assigned by the USSR minister of defense for the current year.

Strengthening planning discipline means elevating all our plans, regardless of their category and scope, to the rank of documents of state importance by reinforcing political indoctrination work with personnel, seeing in this not a goal in itself, but an effective means and, I would say, a necessary condition for maintaining combat readiness of district forces at the level of party demands.

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ARMED FORCES

OUTLINE FOR INDOCTRINATION ON DEFENDING THE SOCIALIST HOMELAND

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 10, May 82 (signed to press 4 May 82) pp 70-77

[Article by Capt 1st Rank Yu. Osipov, candidate of philosophical sciences, docent: "V. I. Lenin on the Socialist Homeland and the Need for Its Armed Protection"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] The section of the training plan "V. I. Lenin on Defense of the Socialist Homeland" begins with this topic. The section consists of five topics, with 12 hours allocated for study of the first and ten each for studying the rest.

The time set aside for each class is best allocated as follows: Initially conduct two two-hour lectures (two narratives) on the topic. After this self-training should be arranged for four hours, and then a four-hour seminar (discussion).

During the class propagandists are called upon to assist students in comprehending more thoroughly the basic provisions of Lenin's teaching on the socialist homeland and the need for its reliable protection, the honorable nature of a USSR Armed Forces soldier's constitutional duty, the essence of Soviet patriotism, and demands of the 26th CPSU Congress for vigilance and combat readiness of the Army and Navy under conditions of a sharp aggravation of the international situation caused by aggressive preparations of imperialism headed by the United States.

/During presentation of the material/ the following questions must be examined: 1. The USSR is the first homeland of workers in the world. 2. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the historical need for defense of the socialist homeland. 3. Love for one's homeland and hatred for its enemies are very important qualities of soldiers and sailors. 4. Be a vigilant soldier and protect the socialist homeland reliably.

/In a brief introduction/ it is important to note that for almost 6½ decades now the USSR Armed Forces have been standing vigilantly on guard over the peaceful, creative labor of Soviet citizens. As with all our people, Army and Navy personnel are struggling persistently to implement resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress. Socialist competition in honor of the 60th anniversary of the USSR's formation has assumed broad scope among personnel under the motto "Reliable protection for the peaceful labor of the Soviet people!"

Soldiers and sailors are helped in performing their honorable duties conscientiously by a deep understanding of Leninist ideals, provisions of the USSR Constitution on defense of the socialist homeland, and demands of the 26th CPSU Congress and the USSR minister of defense on a further increase in defensive capability of the Soviet state and of the combat readiness of its Armed Forces in the face of imperialism's aggressive preparations.

/1. The USSR is the First Homeland of Workers in the World/

Our Motherland, the socialist homeland of workers--the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics--is great and beautiful. Its expanses spread out for almost 10,000 km from west to east and 5,000 km from north to south. The USSR is the largest state of the world in territory. When it is evening in Moscow, the sun already is rising and the workday beginning in Vladivostok. Over 60,000 km comprise the total length of our state borders. This is 1½ times more than the length of the equator. And every meter of the border is vigilantly guarded on the land, on the sea and in the air by Soviet military personnel.

But homeland is not only a geographical concept. It has great historical and social-class meaning. K. Marx and F. Engels created a truly scientific theory of homeland for the first time. They were defending the need for a class approach to the concept of "homeland" and a slogan for its protection. After exposing false bourgeois inventions about a single homeland of oppressors and the oppressed in an exploiting society, the founders of scientific communism persuasively showed that under capitalism workers in a certain sense do not have a homeland.

The workers' natural attachment to the native soil is overshadowed in countries of capital by an awareness that the primary part of wealth created by the people's labor belongs to the exploiters, who direct the bourgeois state's politics in their own interests. Deeply antipopular, unjust customs generate indignation in millions of simple people in these countries and arouse them for a struggle for revolutionary, democratic renewal of society. Only by overthrowing the exploiting system can the working class and toilers of capitalist countries win their genuine, socialist homeland. Creators of the "Communist Party Manifesto" K. Marx and F. Engels noted there that "the proletariat has nothing of its own which it would have to protect; it has to destroy everything that until now protected and secured private ownership" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Sochineniya" [Works], IV, 434).

Further, it is advisable to give a definition of homeland (otechestvo). /Homeland is the native land with its population and resources, the given social, political and cultural environment in which a nation lives and works, and also its language./ This should be followed by a brief explanation of the content of the main attributes of homeland.

In speaking of the /social environment,/ it is important to note that this environment is understood to mean the country's population, economy, classes, social groups of society, the division of people into nationalities and the social relationships which have formed among them.

The social environment largely determines the /political environment./ The state as the primary instrument of power is the most important element of this environment. The nature of the political environment also is determined by the nature and activities of political parties and mass public organizations present in the country.

/The cultural environment/ is an essential attribute of homeland. It includes the types and forms of culture prevalent in the country, the system of education, science, literature and the arts.

/Territory and a nation's language/ also are mandatory attributes of homeland.

It is necessary to explain to the students that along with the concept of "homeland" [or: "native land" or "fatherland"] (otechestvo), there is also the concept of "motherland" [or: "homeland" or "native land"] (rodina). In the broad sense these words are equivalent. In the narrow sense motherland (rodina) is a part of homeland (otechestvo) and indicates the part of the country (kray) where a person was born and grew up or where he has been working and living for a long time.

After describing the attributes of homeland the propagandist moves on to an account of the socialist homeland. Such a homeland arose in our country for the first time on earth. This occurred as a result of the Great October's victory. In the years of Soviet power the primary attributes of homeland were filled with a qualitatively new content.

October broke the bonds of social and national oppression and elevated all nations of our country to an independent historical creativeness. Establishment of the power of the working class and public ownership of means of production laid a firm foundation for the free development of all nations and nationalities and for their close unity and friendship. The CPSU CC Decree "On the 60th Anniversary of the USSR's Formation" states that "history knows no state which would have done as much for comprehensive development of nations and nationalities in the shortest possible time as the USSR, the socialist homeland of all our nations."

Our country's /social environment/ has changed radically. The building of a developed socialist society in the USSR was the result of the revolutionary-transforming work of Soviet citizens led by the Communist Party. Mature socialist social relationships were established in the country and the task of equalizing the levels of economic development of the Soviet republic basically has been accomplished. Legal and factual equality of all nations and nationalities has been assured. A new historical community of people--the Soviet nation--took shape.

Our country's move to new levels of social-economic progress permits the party and people to carry out successfully the tasks of creating the material-technical base of communism, developing social-class and national relationships, improving socialist statehood and democracy and bringing up a new person. The social policy of the CPSU and Soviet state is directed above all at resolving such pressing issues for all nations and nationalities as an increase in welfare, education and culture of the workers, an improvement in

their working and leisure time conditions, development of housing construction, and perfection of the system of social security, medical services and personal services for the population.

Substantial changes have occurred in the /political environment/ in the post-October years. Socialist democracy--democracy for the workers--has been established in the country, receiving its most complete reflection in the most massive, full-fledged entities of state power--the soviets of people's deputies. The 2.3 million elected representatives of the people, party members and nonparty persons, representatives of over 100 nationalities, resolve in the soviets the most important issues of political, social-economic and cultural construction. In contrast to a bourgeois democracy which merely makes a formal proclamation about the equal rights of nations, the socialist democracy reliably protects the social and national interests and rights of Soviet citizens.

Democracy under socialism is inconceivable without authoritative state power which enjoys the full trust of the nation. The Soviet state is a power established and exercised by the workers themselves, which reflects and defends their fundamental interests. The needs and wants of all classes and social groups, nations and nationalities of the country are considered and fulfilled through the system of state and party organizations, trade unions, the Kom-somol, people's control entities, labor collectives, the mass media, and national discussions and election campaigns.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is the directing and guiding force of Soviet society, the nucleus of its political system and of state and public organizations. The USSR Constitution states that the CPSU exists for the people and serves the people.

Further, it is necessary to point out that after the victory of the Great October the shaping of a new /cultural environment/ began in our country. Accomplishment of a cultural revolution in the USSR led to establishment of a culture national in form and socialist in content. Soviet culture is a great force for the ideological-moral solidarity of numerous nations and nationalities of our country and for their mutual spiritual enrichment and development.

An attribute of homeland such as /territory/ also changed in the years of Soviet power. Hundreds of new cities and tens of thousands of the most up-to-date industrial enterprises and large kolkhozes and sovkhoses arose in our country during the building of socialism and communism. Transportation and communications saw large-scale development. The land itself on which we live also was transformed beyond recognition. Through the work of the Soviet citizens it was adorned by manmade seas and canals, ponds and lakes, forest belts and preserves. The party and state are taking steps to protect the environment.

Important positive changes also touched on an attribute of homeland such as /language./ Soviet multinational literature now is published in dozens of languages of USSR nations, many of which did not have their own written language before October. The Russian language, voluntarily accepted by Soviet

citizens as a language of international intercourse, became a powerful factor for strengthening the sociopolitical and ideological unity of our nation and for developing and mutually enriching national cultures.

Thus /the socialist homeland born of the Great October became the first genuine homeland of workers in the world./ It is important to emphasize that from the first days of the Soviet state's existence our nation was faced with the need to defend its revolutionary achievements with guns in hand against encroachments of enemies foreign and domestic.

/2. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the Historical Need for Defense of the Socialist Homeland/

The credit for creating a teaching on defense of the socialist homeland goes to V. I. Lenin. Even before the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, Vladimir Il'ich proved on the basis of a detailed analysis of imperialism that the economic and political development of capitalist countries at this stage occurs unevenly. This is why, Lenin taught, the socialist revolution cannot win simultaneously in all countries. Socialism will win first in one isolated country or several countries, while other countries will remain bourgeois or prebourgeois for a certain time. This has to cause the bourgeoisie to have a direct desire to defeat the socialist state. That state, emphasized Vladimir Il'ich, will have to defend itself not only against internal counterrevolution, but also an external one. The victorious proletariat will be forced to wage just wars for socialism and for the liberation of other nations from the bourgeoisie.

The teaching on defense of the socialist homeland is a most important component of Lenin's theory of socialist revolution. According to this teaching the interests of reliable defense of socialist achievement demand above all creation of a new type of revolutionary army, one that is well organized and technically outfitted, strictly disciplined and possessing high morale.

The historical purpose of our Army, called on, in Lenin's definition, "to safeguard the revolution's achievements and our people's power," objectively meets both fundamental national and international interests of the workers. The Decree on Creation of the Red Army, signed by Lenin, proclaimed that service in the Red Army is an obligation of all Soviet citizens without any restrictions based on a national attribute.

Lenin believed the supreme principle of Soviet military organizational development and the most important source of strength and might of our Armed Forces to be their leadership on the part of the Communist Party. Vladimir Il'ich constantly concerned himself with seeing that all issues of national defense were resolved in close conformity with party politics and under the direction of its Central Committee.

Lenin saw the way toward strengthening the country's economic and defense might as lying in a comprehensive development of industry, the socialist transformation of agriculture, accomplishment of a genuine cultural revolution, resolution of the problems of nationalities and steadfast work for communist indoctrination of the masses of people.

It should be emphasized in particular that Lenin's teaching on the socialist homeland and the need for its armed defense comprise the basis of the CPSU's work in the area of military organizational development and serve as a reliable compass in the further strengthening of national defensive might and an increase in combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Firmly conducting a Leninist peace strategy embodied in the Peace Program for the 1980's adopted by the 26th CPSU Congress, our party and state consider the fact that tension in the international situation and the threat of a new world war arising has risen sharply of late through imperialism's fault. Counting on achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union, the United States is working up the arms race and building up arsenals of mass destruction weapons, including neutron and chemical weapons. It is persistently drawing NATO partners and Japan into its aggressive preparations, using the false myth of the "Soviet threat" for this purpose. But the facts attest irrefutably that in reality the threat to peace stems from the North Atlantic Alliance and its main force, the United States of America.

Washington politicians and strategists cynically declare that, in their opinion, "there are things more important than peace," and they elaborate concepts of a "limited" nuclear war for Europe. These concepts are fraught with catastrophe for all mankind, since any "limited" nuclear conflict, no matter where it begins, inevitably will develop into a general one.

The Communist Party and Soviet state are doing everything possible to disrupt imperialism's aggressive plans aimed at achieving world supremacy and at unleashing a nuclear war for these purposes. Defense of the socialist homeland has been and remains one of the most important functions of the Soviet state and a matter of the whole people. It was noted at the 26th CPSU Congress that in the accountability period the party and state did not lose sight for a single day of matters of strengthening national defensive might and the defensive might of its Armed Forces.

The function of defense of the homeland is not connected with any kind of aggressive aspirations with respect to other countries and nations or with a desire for expanding one's territory at their expense on the part of the Soviet state as well as of all states of the socialist community. It is aimed exclusively at ensuring the security of the socialist homeland against a possible attack by the imperialists and their accomplices. Our country's Basic Law states: "The USSR Armed Forces have been created and universal military obligation established for purposes of protecting socialist achievements, the peaceful labor of the Soviet nation, and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state.

"It is the duty of the USSR Armed Forces to the nation to defend the socialist homeland reliably and be in constant combat readiness guaranteeing an immediate rebuff to any aggressor."

According to the USSR Constitution the state provides for national security and defense and outfits the Armed Forces with everything necessary. Thanks to the steadfast concern of the party, state and the entire Soviet nation our Army and Navy now are at a level in their technical outfitting, organizational

structure and system of control which reflects the latest achievements of science and technology. They are capable of successfully accomplishing missions of defeating any aggressor.

The party teaches that no matter how great the Army and Navy's military-technical capabilities may be, our chief strength consists of the people armed with foremost technology, mastering it to perfection and possessing high moral-political and combat qualities. The major changes in the social structure of Soviet society mentioned at the 26th CPSU Congress are having a positive effect on qualitative features of Army and Navy personnel. At the present time almost 100 percent of Armed Forces personnel have a higher, secondary or incomplete secondary education. Eighty percent of Army and Navy personnel consist of specialists with a higher or secondary education. Ninety percent of all servicemen are party or Komsomol members.

It is a great honor for the Soviet citizen to serve in the USSR Armed Forces. Our state's Basic Law states that defense of the socialist homeland is the sacred duty of every USSR citizen and military service in the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces is an honorable duty of Soviet citizens. Military labor and military service are surrounded in our nation with general respect and love. Soviet citizens rightly see in the serviceman not simply a military specialist, but a person of high moral-political and combat qualities, invested with the workers' great trust and called upon to defend with gun in hand the holiest of holies--the freedom and independence of his socialist homeland.

Defense of the socialist homeland is not only a constitutional duty and obligation of every Soviet citizen, but one of our grand traditions. Courage and heroism in a struggle against enemies of the socialist homeland have distinguished all generations of Soviet citizens. The exceptionally high moral-political and combat qualities of USSR Armed Forces personnel and their unwavering devotion to their people and the native Leninist party were manifested clearly in the years of severe ordeals.

Hundreds of thousands of unparalleled exploits were performed by our military personnel on the battlefield for the honor, freedom and independence of the socialist homeland. Aleksandr Matrosov covered the embrasure of an enemy earth-and-timber emplacement with his chest. This exploit was repeated by over 300 Soviet soldiers. Pilot Viktor Talalikhin did not let an enemy bomber through to the capital. He rammed the enemy aircraft in the Moscow sky when his ammunition came to an end. Later Soviet pilots rammed enemy aircraft some 500 times. They also repeated the exploit of Nikolay Gastello, who directed his warplane, enveloped in flames, at a concentration of enemy personnel and equipment, 327 times.

Over seven million persons were decorated with the Motherland's orders and medals and more than 11,600 were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for courage and valor displayed in fighting against fascism. USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov noted that "the unparalleled mass heroism of Soviet citizens in the menacing years of military ordeals vividly showed the entire world that a nation for which defense of the socialist homeland is a kindred, vital matter is invincible!"

Now it is the sons and grandsons of Great Patriotic War heroes who are in the ranks of the Motherland's defenders. As stated at the 26th CPSU Congress, they did not go through the stern ordeals which fell to the lot of their fathers and grandfathers, but they are true to the heroic traditions of our Army and our people. And each time the interests of national security and defense of the peace demands it, when it is necessary to help victims of aggression, the Soviet soldier stands before the world as a selfless, courageous patriot and internationalist ready to overcome any difficulty.

The high appraisal of the USSR Armed Forces which sounded from the rostrum of the party congress inspires Army and Navy personnel to achieve new successes in training and service. The personnel's patriotic enthusiasm finds its vivid manifestation in socialist competition in honor of the 60th anniversary of the USSR's formation. Army and Navy personnel are full of resolve to celebrate this remarkable holiday with worthy military deeds, high combat readiness and firm discipline. The propagandist should cite concrete examples of the exemplary performance of military duty and socialist pledges by servicemen of his own subunit, unit or ship.

In completing presentation of the second lesson, it is necessary for the propagandist to note that Soviet citizens view military service as their own patriotic work and as socially useful labor ensuring favorable external conditions for the building of communism. Each soldier's understanding of the need for armed protection of the socialist homeland and for the high, honorable missions being performed by the USSR Armed Forces generates in soldiers and sailors a deeply conscientious attitude toward military duty and calls them to perform selfless military labor and, should it be necessary, for an exploit for the sake of the Motherland, for the sake of communism.

/3. Love for One's Homeland and Hatred for Its Enemies are Very Important Qualities of Soldiers and Sailors/

In beginning presentation of the third lesson, it is advisable for the propagandist to remind students that fervent love for one's homeland and a proud feeling of belonging to a unified, socialist Motherland is the basis of high moral-political, psychological and combat qualities and the primary motivating force which gives soldiers valor and courage and leads them to exploits and to mass heroism. This is stated exceptionally clearly and movingly in Comrade Brezhnev's book "Vospominaniya" [Memoirs]: "All of us have a very strongly developed feeling of the Motherland. It is a superb feeling! It is of course nourished not only by contemplation of the beauty of our land. One must set root in it, as they say, and when a person works his hardest on it, cultivates grain, lays out a city, builds a new road or digs foxholes in this land in defending it, then he will understand completely what the Motherland is."

Abstractly, a feeling of love for the Motherland and pride for belonging to the socialist homeland is called Soviet patriotism. It is a typical feature of Soviet patriotism that love for the land of fathers and grandfathers merges indissolubly in our people and Armed Forces personnel with love for our socialist social and state system and with devotion to the ideals of communism. The Soviet patriot sees the meaning of his life and work above all in faithful service to the socialist Motherland and the party cause. The fact

is that CPSU policy reflects the deepest and most fundamental interests of Soviet citizens. It is a matter of honor of every soldier and sailor to carry out in an exemplary manner the instructions of the native party and his honorable constitutional duty of defending the socialist homeland.

Loving one's Motherland and being its patriot means sacredly cherishing and augmenting our revolutionary, combat and labor traditions and following them always and in everything. Each generation receives everything as a heritage from preceding generations that those generations won, produced, built and accomplished, and it goes further and continues its path, this time at a new level and a new stage of historical development. Today a worthy replacement has grown up for the generations of revolutionary fighters, builders of the first five-year plans and Great Patriotic War participants.

All Soviet military personnel represent friendly classes and social groups, nations and nationalities of our society in the Army and Navy combat formation. Each of us, whether he be Russian, Ukrainian, Belorussian, Kazakh, Georgian or a representative of another nationality, is above all a Soviet citizen. Our patriotism is the patriotism of citizens of different nationalities who have a single Motherland--the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics--and who comprise a new historical community of people, the Soviet nation.

No matter where a young lad came from to the Army or Navy, no matter what union or autonomous republic, oblast or kray he lived in before being called into service, no matter what nationality he belongs to, he becomes a full-fledged member of the military family. These equal rights are guaranteed by the USSR Constitution, Soviet laws, military regulations and the entire tenor of Army and Navy life. Every soldier and sailor receives the types of allowances authorized a military person on an equal basis. Regulation demands unified for all are placed on him. He has identical rights and obligations with his colleagues, and satisfies his spiritual needs and takes part in the sociopolitical life of the collective of the subunit, unit, ship or country as a whole on an equal basis with everyone.

To love the socialist Motherland and be its patriot means to have a constant sense of a need to do as much as possible that is useful and necessary for people and the military collective. The true patriot is involved with everything and he feels himself accountable for everything. Such a person not only performs his military duty in an exemplary manner for his own part, but also strives to have a positive influence on his comrades in service.

Love for one's socialist Motherland and devotion to the ideals of communism are organically linked in Soviet citizens and USSR Armed Forces personnel with hatred for our class enemies. This dual quality is an inalienable feature of the Soviet patriot-internationalist. Class irreconcilability and hatred for the most avid enemies of peace and social progress--the imperialists--and for the bourgeois ideology is not a blind feeling, but a deeply perceived understanding of the fundamental contrast of ideals and goals of the two systems--socialist and capitalist.

We hate imperialism because it is the culprit of all wars of our era, including two world wars. Over 50 million persons, including 20 million

Soviet citizens--our grandfathers, fathers, mothers, older brothers, and near and dear ones--died just in the flame of World War II.

We hate imperialism because it is preparing a new world nuclear missile war, the flames of which can destroy the great achievements of human intellect and in which human civilization can perish.

We hate imperialism because it dooms millions of people throughout the world to starvation, suffering and degradation, and it gets fabulously rich through merciless exploitation of the broad masses of people.

We are irreconcilable to imperialism because it is a bulwark of oppression and violence, the main obstacle on the path of mankind's historically inevitable movement to the triumph of freedom, peace and democracy. Being an ardent enemy of socialism, it is not giving up attempts to undermine the foundations of the new system and deprive nations of socialist countries of the supreme revolutionary achievements.

We hate imperialism because the bourgeois ideology morally cripples millions of people, advocates money-grubbing, chauvinism and nationalism, and monstrously distorts our ideals and deeds. We hate it because it is a brake on social progress and an enemy of nations of peace.

After revealing the sources and reasons for our hatred and class irreconcilability toward enemies of the socialist homeland, the propagandist must explain to the students that our class hatred for the enemy does not signify hatred for the workers of bourgeois countries. The Soviet Army always has acted as an army-liberator, defender of the peace and progress of nations. Soviet soldiers defeated Hitler's invaders not for their being a part of the German nation, but for the fact that they invaded our country for the purpose of enslaving it, committed atrocities, looting and violence toward the peaceful population, and brought our nation uncountable disasters and suffering. In destroying the military-political machine of fascism resolutely and mercilessly, the Soviet Army did not set the goal of destroying the German people, but showed a humane attitude of the highest degree toward them.

Writer Mikhail Sholokhov said it well about the patriotism of the Soviet people, defenders of the socialist Motherland: "A nation which managed not only to defend its independence and defeat all enemies, but also become the only lamp of hope for workers throughout the world, is truly great and invincible.

"Isn't being a true son of such a nation, my friends, the greatest happiness for us and our contemporaries? And isn't it we who are now living who are inspired for steadfast labor and new exploits by the stern responsibility for the destiny of the homeland and the party cause; a responsibility which we bear not only before coming generations, but also before the bright memory of those who fought and went to their deaths with the words: 'For the Motherland!'"

Soviet military personnel combine an utter love for their multinational homeland with a feeling of fraternal friendship for nations and armies of countries of the socialist community, and solidarity with all nations struggling

for social and national liberation. Our Army's biography is replete with vivid examples of selfless international assistance given to fighters for freedom and independence.

Traditions of patriotism and internationalism are passed from generation to generation of armed defenders of the Land of Soviets as a glorious baton. And today's military personnel continue this relay worthily. They are performing their duty in a single formation with armies of Warsaw Pact nations. The military-political defensive alliance of socialist states personifies a type of genuinely just, equitable, fraternal relationships among nations unprecedented in history. This alliance serves the peace faithfully and represents a reliable obstacle in the path of aggressive aspirations of imperialism. Allegiance to principles of patriotism and internationalism and to ideals of nations' friendship multiplies the fighting potential of fraternal armies standing on guard over the great achievements of socialism and the cause of peace and social progress.

In completing presentation of the third lesson, it is necessary for the propagandist to emphasize that the Soviet Armed Forces have a glorious, truly heroic biography. It has been formed by all generations of defenders of the socialist homeland, from the Red Guards of 1917 to soldiers of the 1980's. And no matter to which page of this biography we turn, each of them vividly attests to the Soviet soldiers' unshakable devotion to their nation, to their socialist Motherland and to the great cause of the party.

/4. Be a Vigilant Soldier and Reliably Defend the Socialist Homeland/

What does it mean for Soviet military personnel to carry out Lenin's behests and the CPSU's demands for reliable protection of the socialist homeland in practice? It means learning military affairs persistently and in a genuine manner, displaying supreme revolutionary vigilance, maintaining truly iron military discipline and order, and being always on guard, in constant combat readiness.

This is especially important under present-day conditions where U.S. ruling circles have heated the international atmosphere to the limit. The world situation has never been as serious since World War II as now. The drive by U.S. ruling circles for a confrontation with the USSR, the pursuit of military-strategic superiority, the unchecked growth of military expenditures and the expansion in militaristic programs force the Soviet nation and its armed defenders to display unremitting, truly revolutionary vigilance.

Vigilance is a broad concept, many-sided and at the same time concrete. In the political sense revolutionary vigilance is an acute class-consciousness of the Soviet citizen, his political approach to an evaluation of social phenomena and the acts of individuals, irreconcilability toward any manifestations of ideology and morality hostile to us, and an ability to recognize the crafty plans and actions of the enemy and stop them in time.

Vigilance, like other moral-political and combat qualities, is formed in Soviet soldiers by the entire system of training and indoctrination. In practice it is reflected in a special vigilance and prevention of everything which might do harm to national defense and the combat might of the country's Armed Forces.

Vigilance of soldiers and sailors signifies their capability to keep military and state secrets reliably and a constant readiness to defend the achievements of socialism and offer a worthy rebuff to any aggressor.

Soldiers and sailors' constant combat readiness serves as a concrete manifestation of their vigilance. The demands are steadily growing on combat readiness of Army and Navy forces. High troop schooling is the basis for such readiness. In order to acquire such schooling it is necessary to work diligently in classes and drills, value the training time, and show activeness and persistence during socialist competition. It must not be forgotten that modern combat is strenuous and fast-moving and that the enemy is strong, crafty and technically well outfitted. Learning to hit targets with the first round, burst, launch or pass, to become outstanding in training, a rated specialist and a master of military affairs--this is what each soldier should strive for from the first days of service. Military proficiency comes to the person who regards the performance of his regulation duties with all responsibility and diligence and views them as a matter of great state importance.

Today's combat actions largely are collective actions. They demand joint efforts of soldiers of different specialties. Imprecision or a mistake in the work even of one specialist may lead to the most serious consequences. It is not enough for today's military specialist to learn only his own functional duties, for when necessary he will have to replace a disabled comrade. For this purpose we must strive for complete interchangeability in every squad, team and crew and at every battle station.

Military strategists of imperialism say a great deal about the need for preparing for a surprise nuclear strike on the USSR. In order to repulse such a surprise attack by the aggressor a certain portion of Soviet personnel perform operational readiness daily. Operational readiness is the performance of a combat mission in peacetime. It is no accident that the personnel who perform operational readiness are called the first echelon, which is called upon to enter battle against the enemy without delay and disrupt his aggressive plans.

It is important for every soldier, every specialist going on operational readiness, to have a deep understanding of its state importance and his own personal responsibility for the Motherland's security, and be constantly ready to wage a skilled and courageous struggle against the real enemy. And to this end he has to learn his weapon to the fine points, be able to use its combat capabilities to the full extent, and strictly carry out the demands of instructions and manuals regulating work with equipment.

Firm military discipline, strict regulation order and efficiency in subunits, units and aboard ships represent a necessary component of high vigilance and constant combat readiness of the troops. Every serviceman's law of life must be steadfast observance of regulation demands, faultless discipline and execution. His commanders, the military collective, the sense of comradesly cohesion, a friend's shoulder, a friend's elbow and a friend's loyalty will help the soldier and sailor become such.

Firm ideological conditioning and political awareness represent the basis of high moral-combat qualities of Soviet military personnel. Communist

conviction elevates the soldier spiritually and gives him new energy. Political training serves as an important means of ideological conditioning. Every soldier and sailor has to have a conscientious attitude toward increasing his political knowledge and expanding his horizons, and deeply understanding his personal responsibility for protection of the Soviet people's peaceful labor.

In completing presentation of material on the topic, the propagandist should draw the conclusion that defense of the socialist homeland is an honorable duty and constitutional obligation of every Soviet citizen. At the 26th CPSU Congress Comrade Brezhnev, in the name of the party Central Committee, expressed the firm conviction that the Motherland's famed defenders will continue to stand reliably on guard over the peaceful, creative labor of the Soviet people. And Soviet military personnel are doing everything to justify the high trust of our native Leninist party. True to Lenin's behests and the CPSU's instructions on defense of the socialist homeland, they are always on guard, in constant combat readiness.

Army and Navy personnel will be faced with major complex missions in the current training year. The summer training period now is beginning among the troops. It is a matter of honor of every soldier and sailor to ensure that the year of the 60th anniversary of the USSR's formation is marked with high results in training and service, in strengthening of military discipline, and in an increase in vigilance and combat readiness. After pointing to concrete achievements by personnel of his own subunit, unit or ship, the propagandist should orient the students on new successes in combat and political training and in elevating their military proficiency.

/For independent reading/ it should be recommended that students read Lenin's work "Address to the Red Army" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collected Works], XXXVIII, 234-235), the USSR Constitution (articles 31, 32, 62, 63); Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's report "CPSU Central Committee Report to the 26th CPSU Congress and Upcoming Party Tasks in Domestic and Foreign Policy" ("Materialy XXVI s'yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], pages 20-31, 66); the CPSU CC Decree "On the 60th Anniversary of the USSR's Formation" (PRAVDA, 21 February 1982); Comrade Brezhnev's book "Vospominaniya" [Memoirs] (Politizdat, 1981); Chapter One of the textbook for political studies "V. I. Lenin o zashchite sotsialisticheskogo Otechestva" [V. I. Lenin on Defense of the Socialist Homeland] (Voyenizdat, 1981).

/In the seminar class (in the discussion)/ it is necessary to discuss the following issues: 1. What is the homeland and what are its primary attributes? 2. What is the fundamental distinction of socialist homeland from bourgeois homeland? 3. V. I. Lenin on the need for defense of the socialist homeland. 4. The 26th CPSU Congress and USSR Constitution on missions of the Soviet Armed Forces. 5. What does it mean to love one's Motherland? What qualities characterize a Soviet patriot? 6. Why do we hate imperialism? 7. What does it mean to be a vigilant soldier under present-day conditions? 8. Wherein is the serviceman's personal responsibility for security of his socialist homeland reflected? 9. Why are demands increasing on combat readiness of personnel at the present time?

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ARMED FORCES

CONTENTS OF MILITARY NEWSPAPERS REVIEWED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 10, May 82 (signed to press 4 May 82) pp 89-91

[Newspaper review by Capt 1st Rank I. Bocharov: "Facets of Ideological Influence"]

[Text] In accordance with resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress Army and Navy commanders, political entities and party members are consistently striving for unity of ideological-theoretical, political-indoctrination, and organizational work. They are giving particular attention to elevating the scientific level of propaganda, strengthening its spirit, offensive nature, currency and effectiveness, and reinforcing its link with life.

An important place in this work is held by the district, group and fleet press, which widely covers processes of ideological influence on various aspects of Army and Navy life. Special sections are run in the newspapers in which party and state domestic and foreign policy is explained, many materials are published devoted to the 60th anniversary of the USSR's formation, and there is wide propaganda of the social-economic achievements of our country and all its nations and nationalities. Numerous articles tell about the ideological growth of service personnel and about the work of commanders, political entities, and party and Komsomol organizations in the political, moral, legal and military indoctrination of personnel.

The military press has begun to generalize in more detail and disseminate widely the foremost experience of ideological work gained since publication of the CPSU CC Decree dated 26 April 1979. The attempt by military journalists to treat the fundamental problems advanced by this document is noticeable. Many of them are reflected in the rubrics: "26th CPSU Congress: A Meaningful, Current and Lively Character for Ideological Work," "The Ideological Aktiv: Work Style," and "A Vivid and Meaningful Nature for Visual Agitation." Along with coverage of the work of ideological front fighters to explain demands of the party, the USSR minister of defense and chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy placed on military personnel, there is a demonstration of work by propagandists and agitators to mobilize personnel for a comprehensive improvement in combat and political training and for strengthening of military discipline.

The primary forms of personnel political training are in the focus of the military press above all. Articles emphasize the need for a careful study of program material and direct use of the works of K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin not only by group instructors, but by all personnel. It is not a matter of a cursory and superficial familiarization with individual articles of the works by classics of Marxism-Leninism, but a detailed, integral study of their work and arming every serviceman with knowledge of the laws of social development and a clear understanding of party policy.

The newspaper SOVETSKAYA ARMIYA (GSFG) published the article entitled "Method: Narrative-Discussion." Its author, Gds Sr Lt V. Soldatov, is one of the best political study group instructors in the unit. He took as a basis the class on the topic "Socialist Competition in the Army and Navy," told in detail about preparations for it, and substantiated the need for studying primary sources: works by founders of scientific communism, Lenin's works, and party documents. The officer notes that in order to make the class more interesting and emotional he reads excerpts from works of fiction. And of course he thinks out ahead of time what examples from the life of the subunit and unit, visual aids and technical means of propaganda he can use in the course of the narrative; he notes when to turn to a diagram or poster and when to show a segment of a film strip.

It would appear that everything mentioned in the article is known to every propagandist. Nevertheless the reader is won over by the persuasiveness of proof of the direct relationship of class effectiveness to how the instructor prepares for it.

SOVETSKAYA ARMIYA treats the topic of political training not from occasion to occasion, but from day to day. In all articles one senses a desire to show the natural connection of concrete results in the personnel's daily activities with their ideological conditioning and theoretical store of knowledge. This attempt by the editorial collective stems from party demands about the efficiency and concreteness of propaganda and agitation and its link with life.

The selections of SOVETSKAYA ARMIYA which cover the experience of mass political work gained in units and subunits are interesting in content and diversified in form. In short notes, reports and articles, usually written clearly and intelligibly, one senses the emotional elation of soldiers who have come to the officers' club or enlisted men's club to meet with well-known people, chat about pressing matters, or listen to works by classics of Russian and Soviet literature or music which stirs the soul...

A large part of the articles is about topical morning gatherings, but neither the topics nor subject matter are repeated in them. These articles supplement each other as it were and create an integral picture of the active participation of cultural enlightenment establishments in personnel indoctrination. "The Chronicle Continues"--that was the title of one of the articles devoted to a topical morning gathering in one of the subunits where there was an emotional discussion about the Soviet soldier's duty to defend the Motherland and forward lines of countries of the socialist community.

Presentations by the newspaper BOYEVAYA VAKHTA are distinguished by the importance of topics raised in ideological and political indoctrination work. The article "This Quite Difficult Genre" was published in its pages. The article emphasizes that Lt A. Kuz'min prepared thoroughly for a political briefing on the topic "The Most Democratic in the World." He thoughtfully studied the requisite literature, chose excerpts from newspapers and journals and drew up a plan for his presentation. His narrative naturally abounded in instructive facts and interesting comparisons. Kuz'min spoke in a well-reasoned manner about the importance of the new USSR Constitution in our country's life and about the rights and duties of Soviet citizens. But when he tried to tie in everything he said with the life and work of the unit and subunit, the political briefing acquired a didactic tone and began to abound in general discourse and lectures far from the topic.

It was possible to explain what happened as a young officer's vexing mistake and inexperience, but soon the author encountered another similar instance. He began to look into it more carefully. It turned out that both lieutenants were conscientious people but had not been sufficiently provided with the methodology of conducting political briefings.

The attempt by the collective of BOYEVAYA VAKHTA to show the work of agitators and their training as clearly and convincingly as possible is praiseworthy. One such article, entitled "Who Will Assist the Agitator?", was published under the rubric "Training of the Ideological Aktiv: Concerns of the Day." The article states that during brief minutes of a breather in an exercise a debate broke out among the personnel concerning one international problem. They turned for an explanation not just to anyone, but to their agitator Sgt D. Sin. The correctness of that choice becomes understandable later. The agitator regards his assigned job with love and a great sense of responsibility, for which he receives the sincere gratitude of his comrades. His commanders and political workers helped him become accustomed to this difficult but very necessary and interesting work.

"I remember my first discussions," (the newspaper is referring to the sergeant's statement). "I seemingly knew the material and the lesson plan was in front of me, but something still was wrong. I was talking, but I myself sensed that they were listening to me without interest. And I was not speaking, but mumbling, which was disgusting to me. . . . Of course, I was not the only one who was that way. The other agitators also didn't do a very good job. But Sr Lt Shandarov worked with us; all together and with each individually. In addition the regular talks at general and Komsomol meetings, at bureau sessions and at political training seminars helped polish the speaking."

These words provide an outline, as it were, of the subsequent discussion in the article about work with agitators and arming them with necessary theoretical knowledge and methods skills of working with colleagues.

Recently BOYEVAYA VAKHTA presented the readers with a new rubric which in our view responds to the spirit of the time: "Ideological Work: From the Monologue to the Dialogue." One senses in the first articles published under this rubric an attempt by the propagandist aktiv to bring its mobilizing word to

every soldier and to shift in public speaking from the monologue to the dialogue, i.e., to turn every lecture and talk into a lively, interesting discussion of like-thinkers, people made cohesive by a common cause and a single duty to the Motherland.

And so, relying on accumulated experience, the newspapers have a beneficial effect on further improvement in the practice of political, military, moral and esthetic indoctrination of personnel. Nevertheless, the question naturally arises: Has everything been completed in this important and responsible matter? Of course not. There are many articles in the pages of newspapers about elevating the quality of propaganda, information and all ideological indoctrination work. At times businesslike suggestions are made. For a long while articles have been persuading the reader persistently that propagandists "have begun to give fuller consideration," "tie in more closely" and so on. It stands to reason that this is the case in life, but there still have been few well-reasoned confirmations to such assurances.

BOYEVAYA VAKHTA published the article "With Consideration of Increased Demands" under the rubric "Ideological Work Practice." This title obligates us to a great deal. A reader, especially one from the propagandist aktiv, rightly expects that he will find for himself valuable recommendations on how best to organize ideological-political work with consideration of the demands of the time. But these expectations are in vain. The article makes casual mention of certain "mysterious" omissions in the work of an agitprop group in the past. There was a "frank, useful discussion" about them at a session of the party committee with the participation of agitprop group members and the unit command element. The newspaper asserts that the benefit was unquestionable.

It further mentions that agitprop group members are organizing the work of the propagandist aktiv of subunits, which assures great progress of the personnel and develops "a desire to scale the heights of the Marxist-Leninist heritage." Then one paragraph each is devoted to telling about propaganda work of a combat glory museum, Lenin rooms, an enlisted men's club and a library. And then the very reassuring conclusion: "The concrete, goal-oriented work of agitprop group members is producing positive results." It is unfortunate that the editors just were not able to show this concreteness and purposefulness in the newspaper.

We know that a scientific nature is an important feature of ideological work at the present stage and a source of its efficient, vital force and effectiveness. But there still are few articles in the newspapers being reviewed which analyze in an objective and businesslike manner just how this party demand is being implemented and how the personnel are studying works by classics of Marxism-Leninism, CPSU history, documents of party congresses and works by Comrade Brezhnev which make a great contribution to scientific elaboration of the problems of building communism. Some timidity of the editorial workers is understandable here. An appropriate theoretical, methodological and professional training is needed by every journalist for revealing such responsible topics. It is apparent that this is still lacking. To accomplish this task there must be an improvement in the organization of Marxist-Leninist and command training in the editorial offices, each and every person must gain an

interest in the actuality and political acuteness of lectures and seminars, consideration must be given to an increase in a journalist's knowledge in summarizing competition results, and there must be regular individual interviews.

The practice of anti-imperialist, atheistic propaganda and mass agitation work to mobilize public opinion against negative phenomena alien to the Soviet way of life still is being covered poorly in places. In this way the party demand for a comprehensive development of the fighting, offensive spirit of propaganda and agitation is not being implemented sufficiently.

It is practically impossible from newspaper articles to identify features of ideological work with different categories of personnel. For example, at various times SOVETSKAYA ARMIYA published articles entitled "With Each Person Individually" and "Unity of Word and Deed." The first tells about a political study group with rank-and-file personnel and the second about warrant officer political studies. But the articles vary only in topic and their approach to revealing them, the facts and the authors' judgements are similar. In one case the class instructor helped a private receive a high grade in political training, and in another he helped a warrant officer become a disciplined soldier. With respect to methods and content of the officers' work, they do not differ at all from each other although the make-up of the audience is far from identical. For a newspaper not to notice this means not to have its articles influence the methodology of agitprop work.

Sketches and essays about the best T/O&E and non-T/O&E propagandists represent one of the effective forms of this influence. There is an opportunity here to show all facets of the ideological activists' creative work in a lively, intelligible format. Unfortunately there are insufficient grounds to express praise of one of the newspapers reviewed for this reason. All of them include such articles very rarely and those which are published are written without serious or profound generalizations. After familiarization with them it is difficult to get rid of the thought that articles devoted to fighters of the ideological front are among the worst versions of the essay genre.

Why does this happen? The propagandist's chief and at times only weapon is the word. Since this is so, as some journalists believe, it is inevitable to have monotony in a discussion about ideological workers. This is a completely incorrect opinion. The trouble is that the authors of a majority of sketches and essays chiefly speak about the propagandist's word, but do not show this word in action, do not reveal the character and specific nature of the contents of a lecture or talk the propagandist gives people, and do not use to their fullest the enormous capabilities of party writing for showing the main character himself and his position in life. And if the person is not shown and his work not revealed, not even the most high sounding phrases about him save the situation. The article turns out to be empty and uninteresting.

Today the complexity and scope of the tasks of communist indoctrination place very high demands on ideological work. It is the duty of all our district, group and fleet press to provide wide coverage and comprehensively help its effective influence on a further increase in vigilance and combat readiness and on a strengthening of military discipline.

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ARMED FORCES

PERSONALITY OF THE SOVIET OFFICER DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Oct 81 p 2-3

[Article by Lieutenant General Professor D. Volkogonov, doctor of philosophical sciences: "The Personality of the Soviet Officer, Social Aspects of Military Development"]

[Text] The present-day social character, or outlook, of the Soviet officer is inseparable from the character of the citizen of our mature socialist society, the character of a person molded and developed by the party. This character combines such marks of the builder of a new society as patriotism and internationalism, communist conviction and great vital energy, a high level of culture and knowledge and an ability to apply it. Also characteristic of the Soviet officer are a number of specific traits which are conditions by the special nature of his work.

Analysis of the most typical traits of the social character of the Soviet officer is possible only on the basis of the methodological principles of the Marxist-Leninist theory of the personality. The most important of these was formulated by K. Marx in his *Theses on Feuerbach*: "...The essential character of the human being is not an abstract peculiar to a particular individual. It is in fact the aggregate of all social relations."

We are not born with our personalities; our personalities rather develop under the effect of an entire spectrum of social relations. In addition to universal qualities (a capacity for work, social intercourse and thought), they always come to take on qualities with which they are endowed by a specific class (a world view, convictions, distinct social senses). At the same time, however, a personality is always a unique individuality with traits characteristic only of it. They characterize it in terms of level of professional skill, general culture and creative capacities as well as of interests, character and volitional qualities.

Socialism affords for the formation of a well-rounded and harmoniously developed personality. Realization of these possibilities under the conditions of military service makes it possible to develop the personality of the Soviet officer as a bearer of collectivist morality and a profound sense of personal responsibility for the fate of the motherland.

Ideological Commitment - A Spiritual Reactor

Thanks to our party's ideological indoctrination effort, the personality of the Soviet officer undergoes continuous development and improvement, in the process taking on new

aspects and traits and becoming increasingly well-endowed and well-defined. Within the range of its moral, political and professional qualities, communist ideological conviction occupies a central place. It is precisely this, the most important, determining factor, which characterizes the Soviet officer, communist or Komsomol, the bearer of party policy to the masses of troops.

"Communist ideological commitment," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev has declared, "represents an alloy of knowledge, conviction and practical activity." It is precisely this alloy which distinguishes the personality of the Soviet officer. His ideological commitment is expressed first of all in his mastery of a great amount of knowledge in a variety of fields: sociopolitical, natural science, technical, military. In our time--a period of scientific and technical advancement--the role of /true knowledge/ [in boldface] has become an enormous one. It is essential to the officer not only so that he can become highly skilled in his work, but also that he can maintain a proper orientation in this complex, dynamic world, correctly evaluate events and see the trends and regularities in the course of social development.

Full, systematic mastery of this knowledge will produce an officer of flexible, dynamic, I would even say bold thinking. Resting upon deep moral and political convictions and scientific knowledge, this thinking enhances the moral strength of the officer and keeps it continuously oriented toward a search for the unconventional solution, toward overcoming difficulties to be encountered in any given situation. Inadequate knowledge, knowledge of only limited breadth, on the other hand, will usually lead to immature, conservative thinking inclined toward the outmoded and conventional. These habits of thought can be quickly paralyzed by the heavy moral-psychological stresses, for example, of modern-day warfare. When he encounters a difficult obstacle, a person with this mode of thinking will rest all his hopes in ready-made, conventional plans and solutions.

Now knowledge, of course, becomes of true value /only/ [in boldface] as it is enlightened by progressive, innovative ideas, when there is a clear-cut social orientation to its application. This will be the product of /communist convictions/ [in boldface], which are based upon the truth of Marxism-Leninism. They, these convictions, take the form of principles, standards, ideals, judgements and opinions concerning the present and the future, things personal and things social. The officer with this kind of awareness, this kind of consciousness, will be better able to control his feelings and emotions and orient them in the proper direction. To restrain or suppress them (manifestations of fear, uncertainty, inconsistency etc.) in one instance, to stimulate them in another.

The officer's ideological conviction is essentially a unique spiritual reactor which generates his energy, indicates the orientation of his thinking, his feelings and his actions and instills confidence in the correctness of his views and his outlook on life. It is for precisely this reason that for our military cadres a thorough study of the classics of Marxism-Leninism and of party documents and decisions is a matter of the utmost importance. It is important in this connection to stress the development not only of a mastery of the methodological and philosophical principles of communist ideology, but also of a consistent ability to realize them in everyday practice. Only in this case will theoretical training become a driving force behind the individual personality,

We consider ideologically committed that individual whose /philosophical principles do not diverge from his deeds/ [in boldface], his conduct, his actions. The CPSU Central

Committee decree "Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work" emphasizes that "Soviet people must convert a knowledge of revolutionary theory and party policy to the conviction and active outlook on life of the stalwart fighter for communism and against all manifestations of alien ideology, to a guide to action for solving the urgent problems of mature socialism." This call fully applies to our officer cadres as well. The ideologically committed individual will never bargain with his conscience, be seduced into taking the "easy way" or be frightened by difficulties.

Army life provides many examples of highly ideologically motivated conduct. It is to be seen, for example, in an officer's social involvement, when he takes every opportunity to play an active role; in his deep sense of moral responsibility, when he sees and strives for the fulfillment of subunit, unit or ship obligations in competition as if they were his own or in his constant devotion to party, military and civil duties. The strength of conviction will make it possible for an officer to bear up steadfastly under the trials and burdens coming from one duty day to the next, testing experiences which may occasionally prove more difficult for an individual than those to be encountered over shorter periods of time in exceptional circumstances.

There are instances, however, when a person will say and do one thing in public, in the presence of others, but another in private. If the spirit of an individual like this is not properly tempered, if he is not continuously indoctrinated, then in a difficult real-life situation he may depart all along the line from the norms of our communist morality and abandon his responsibilities to society.

One of the indicators of an officer's ideological commitment is his refusal to reconcile himself to manifestations of bourgeois ideology and to tolerate anything conflicting with communist morality or the requirements of the military oath and regulations. It was pointed out at the 26th CPSU Congress that there are still people among us who have yet to free themselves of the shackles of petty bourgeois philistinism, from the psychology of acquisitiveness, from indifference to the concerns and affairs of the people. Individuals like this cannot be tolerated among the ranks of our officers, as is the case with even isolated instances of drunkenness, slackness, unprincipledness, arrogance and coarseness.

The difficult international situation also dictates an intolerance of survivals from the past and a struggle against bourgeois ideology. The imperialists are trying to reverse the course of history, to slow down the objective process of world renewal and to alter the world military balance in their favor and to the detriment of the Soviet Union. It is important for our military cadres to keep continuously in mind the party's findings as regards the present-day distribution of world political and military forces and upon this basis to develop their own attitude toward the military danger as a harsh reality of our time. The officer's deep ideological commitment must today manifest itself above all in an unfailing concern for maintaining the combat readiness of his subunit, unit or ship at a level commensurate with present-day requirements.

Self-discipline, Will, Honor

Personal qualities such as self-discipline, will and honor play a special role in the officer's professional activity. Through the prism of these qualities we see refracted many other military and moral qualities the officer must possess to be able successfully to control his subunit or unit in peacetime as well as in war, to teach his men and to stand as a strong, clear example for them.

The degree of an officer's consciousness and awareness is to be seen most clearly manifested in his /self-discipline/ [in boldface]. We observe this in a serviceman's attitude toward his responsibilities when the external legal requirement fully coincides with his inner moral impulses. When each of his actions are based, as it were, upon a convergence, a confluence of the dictates of his conscience and the demands of duty. We could even say that self-discipline is conscience in action. It manifests itself in a variety of forms: moral self-control, self-possession, self-denial. As a moral quality, self-discipline not only performs a restraining function (limiting oneself with respect to one thing or another, suppressing negative feelings, delivering oneself from temptation etc.), it can also play a role in giving a positive orientation to personal conduct (in achieving, doing, overcoming, discovering, performing).

If an individual possesses the necessary degree of self-discipline it will be manifest in his adherence to principle and in the exactingness of the demands he makes of himself. Properly taught and indoctrinated, he will always make greater demands of himself than of those around him. In an officer's self-discipline is thus to be seen his ability to retain mastery over himself and to control his conduct in the simple situations as well as the complex and difficult, on duty as well as at home, in peacetime and under wartime conditions. This will increase his possibilities of influencing those around him by the force of his example and of serving as a model of conduct for his men.

Unlike any other sphere of activity, the military, military service, requires people who are strong-willed, persistent in striving to achieve objectives, people capable of overcoming any difficulties. In the /volitional component/ [in boldface] of consciousness we see expressed the synthesis of reason and emotion, a synthesis capable of converting ideas and decisions to deeds, thought to practical action. Knowledge makes it possible for an individual to be competent, feelings for him to be noble. But will permits convictions, intentions and intellectual conceptions to be converted into a particular line of conduct, to concrete deeds. The will could be said to be like the "muscles" of the mind. It is the driving force of the intellect. A strong will makes the intellect vigorous, active, goal-oriented and resolute.

All of these volitional components are vitally necessary to efforts to maintain high levels of subunit, unit and ship combat readiness. The strong-willed officer will be able to implement the decision which has been made, to realize socialist obligations which have been undertaken, to maintain strict adherence to regulation procedures in his military organization.

The personality of the Soviet officer--as a professional military man--embodies a particular /attitude toward honor/ [in boldface]. The honor of an officer consists in worthily discharging his military duties, while, conversely, discharge of military duty is a matter of honor. An ability to approach his obligations consciously, to see the measure of his responsibility for the sphere of activity with which he has been entrusted, to do everything necessary to avoid detracting from his honor in the eyes of those around him--these are all important indicators of the officer's moral maturity. Honor, like a fragile container, has to be carefully preserved. Life has demonstrated that people will sooner suffer any misfortune other than a sully of their honor. As we have said above, it stands in direct dependence upon the individual's discharge of his responsibilities. Not for nothing do we have the ancient saying defining honor as duty's poetry.

In the eyes of those around him, the honor of an officer ordinarily finds expression in the moral authority the commander or political officer can summon to his assistance in exercising his moral influence upon his subordinates and others around him. We would give particular emphasis in this connection to the fact that the greater the conviction, the nobility of character, the consistency in action and his concern for people, the greater will be the officer's moral influence upon them.

These along with many other ideological, intellectual and moral facets of the officer's personality together go together to make up his competence: his professional soundness and reliability. An understanding of the trends of social development and knowledge in the area of present-day military art, the latest in military hardware and military pedagogy and psychology, these combined with possession of a broad range of good personal qualities will enable an officer to be successful in solving problems on the battlefield or in the process of training and instructing his subordinates. The level of an officer's professional competence essentially indicates how fully and responsibly he is capable of discharging his military duty.

A high degree of professional training and preparedness on the part of a particular officer will in turn be expressed and reinforced in a style of work which, as was stressed at the 26th CPSU Congress, organically combines efficiency and discipline with bold initiative and enterprise, practicality and a businesslike approach with an orientation toward important objectives and a critical attitude toward deficiencies with unshakable confidence in the historic advantages of the path we have chosen.

This style of work is characteristic of many of our commanders and political officers today. We have seen yet another piece of convincing evidence of this--the successful performances turned in by subunits, units and formations in the course of the "Zapad-81" exercises.

Formative Factors

The formation and development of a personality occur under the influence of a great variety of factors. Of the overall range of these factors we should mention above all the following.

Basic is the /general sociological/ [in boldface] factor. It is decisive. The effect of social conditions on the development of the personality is realized in a variety of forms: the influence of life style, the system of training and indoctrination, morals, customs, habits, social ideals. All these forms of influence are linked with both the present and the future. Important at the same time is the form of influence mediated by time: through the medium of history, the human mind, many social, political and military events of the past continue for long periods of time, sometimes entire epochs, to exercise an enormous influence upon the human consciousness and contribute to the evolution of traditions.

The true collective and comradely relations which have become established in our country, the solidarity and friendship growing with each passing day between the nations and peoples of the USSR, the dominance of communist ideology, the moral health of the people, the harmonious, well-ordered system of training and indoctrinating them, everything, in fact, subsumed under the rubric of the "Soviet way of life"--all these things have a decisive effect upon an individual's philosophical orientation, his personal qualities, his outlook on life. The personality takes shape in the process of the individual's interaction with his social environment. We see here the expression of an established social law: as is the society, so will be the individual personality.

A second formative factor, a derivative of the first, is a /specific/ [in boldface] factor. It reflects the influence of military service on the development of the personality of the Soviet officer. The most important characteristic of the everyday life and conditions prevailing in today's military consists in the exceptionally critical necessity of maintaining a continuous state of combat readiness. This characteristic is a factor of enormous importance leaving an indelible imprint upon the whole mode, rhythm and nature of modern-day military life. The arms race the imperialists are carrying on with far-reaching objectives and U.S. pretensions to world leadership cannot but find reflection in the social acuity of the Soviet officer's intellect. He ponders the fate of mankind, the role to be played by the armed forces of socialism in the conflict between the two worlds, the specific place the human being is to find in this struggle.

Soviet fighting men accomplish their mission of defending the gains of socialism shoulder to shoulder with their brothers, fraternal in both class and spirit, in the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries. Participation in joint exercises, exchanges of experience in improving the state of combat training, in the organization of party political work and other contacts--all these activities indoctrinate our officers in the spirit of socialist internationalism and military collaboration with members of the armed forces of the socialist countries.

The nature of the military duty day with its strict regulation procedures, its own special rhythms and tempos and rules, itself exercises a specific influence upon the development of the officer's personality. Major advances in military technology, too, leave their imprint upon the officer's personality. The officer directly involved in the accomplishment of the large-scale tasks associated with the effort to strengthen the country's defense capability nowadays bears a substantially greater degree of social responsibility. Military service organically combined with Marxist-Leninist training--this constitutes the primary course of the officer's spiritual, moral and professional development.

There is, of course, another factor, which derives from the first two: /a capacity for self-education and self-instruction/ [in boldface]. The social environment, the specific conditions of military life involved and the system of training and service are, of course, of decisive importance for the officer's development. It is at the same time entirely clear, however, that it is very difficult to make an individual spiritually strong, noble in character, courageous and responsible if he does not strive toward these objectives himself. This factor in the formation of the personality is very subjective. One cannot force an individual to teach himself anything, just as one cannot, for example, order him to like music. Let us recall in this connection that contemplation pure and simple is alien to self-instruction. A program of self-instruction will be successful only in the process of work, training and social activity. Anything we achieve we will be able to achieve only through action.

A look at practical experience and the lives of many leading revolutionaries, scientists and military leaders reveals that they have all consciously undertaken to develop certain intellectual, moral and military qualities. The lives of people like this provide for the Soviet officer clear examples of conscious efforts to organize the individual spiritual world. What distinguishes these people is their effort to bring the real as closely into line as possible with the ideal; they know that life cannot wreck true ideals, but that it demolishes only feeble illusions.

The most important way for an officer to realize his ideal is to develop a mastery of the teachings of Marxism-Leninism and the basic principles of the natural and technical sciences and of military theory. Only by taking possession of this treasury of scientific knowledge will he be able to develop the intellectual capacity for analysis and synthesis and an ability to go beyond the abstract to the concrete and to employ the recommendations of theory in military practice and in the process of training and indoctrinating subordinates.

* * *

People in our country say the profession of the Soviet officer--the commander and political officer--is an heroic profession. Faithful, boundless, self-sacrificing service to the cause of the party and the people is a noteworthy tradition of our officer corps. To be worthy of this priceless tradition each officer now measures his own steps against the heroic destinies of our fathers and grandfathers. The story of his military career is now being written on the exercise grounds, in the skies over the motherland, on naval cruises, in the duties he performs at our missile complexes.

Only noble thoughts and resolve and actual, concrete deeds will add these glorious lines to the record of an officer's career. It is upon his actions, the selfless discharge of his military duties that will to a decisive degree depend the success of the effort to increase the combat strength of the Soviet Armed Forces, which are insuring the favorable external conditions for the building of communism in our country.

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GROUND FORCES

COMMANDER LENINGRAD MD ON TRAINING

Moscow SOVETSKIY VOIN in Russian No 14, Jul 81 (signed to press 26 Jun 81) pp 2-3

[Interview with Colonel General M. I. Sorokin, commander, Leningrad Military District, by SOVETSKIY VOIN correspondent; date and place not given: "By the Exacting Measure of Combat"]

[Text] What do we mean when we speak of up-to-date troop training? What problems does this concept embrace? Colonel General M. I. Sorokin, commander of the Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District and delegate to the 26th CPSU Congress, responds to questions from our correspondent.

Not too long ago a group of Soviet Army veterans visited a training center of one of the units (chast') of our district. I would point out here that these were people who had been around, people who had been through and seen a lot in their day. Each wore several rows of ribbon bar holders and one or two academic insignia on their chests; all had three or four decades of army service behind them. You hardly ever see people like this, we often say. But these guests were nevertheless struck by everything they saw: from the blue spruce shading the elegant architectural complexes on the training grounds to the highly complex electronic innards of the various simulator units. They asked the unit commander: "Did your men really build all this themselves? Were they really themselves able on the basis of complex engineering computations and, what is most important, in precise accordance with the time requirement to build these unique instruments and facilities, which are having such a striking impact upon the process of training and developing specialists in line with the mission requirements of their motorized rifle unit?"

"We didn't have anything like this in our units when we were in the service," one of the veterans remarked.

"And only in our units...? Back in my day I taught in a military academy. Neither we, the instructors, nor the cadets at the academy of course ever even dreamed of such things," added another. "Everything here has been done rationally, efficiently and tastefully. You can only take pleasure in the fact that technical aesthetics has now found its way into the units and even the subunits (podrazdeleniye). This is a sign of the times. The advantage is there: finely designed display stands and diagrams draw the trainees' attention and help them concentrate on the subject at hand, while the convenient layout of instruments and mechanisms permits familiarization with them

in strict sequence and observation of how they operate. As far as methodology and technique are concerned, during each session of instruction specialists are able not only to hear the instructor's presentation and explanations in connection with a particular subject, but also to take notes on the main points and then to practice and acquire the necessary practical skills."

I have recounted this dialogue in order to emphasize the rapidity of the change the foundation of the combat training process, its training equipment and materials base, is undergoing in our day. We can most assuredly take pride in the creations of the skilled experts of our district's organizations and training centers. But the modern training equipment and materials base in other military districts will be found to be no less sophisticated.

Scientific and technical progress in the military field has conditioned and at the same time greatly improved the standards and conditions of our program of troop training and education. The USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, has required that we take into account the ever increasing possibilities for improving the effectiveness and quality of military duty performance and that we be always able to measure up to the tasks which life itself will set out Armed Forces. They, that is, these tasks, consist first and foremost in developing a mastery of today's military weapons and equipment and the methods by which they will be most effectively employed on the battlefield. These tasks are accomplished as aspects of an integrated whole along with consistent, well-planned, systematic, rigorously scientific development of high fighting qualities in our personnel, simultaneously with the process by which they are tempered ideologically, politically, morally and psychologically.

To give our troops up-to-date training means to teach them what war requires. This is our fundamental principle, a principle which has long since become a law. And for a soldier war means first and foremost doing battle with the extreme nervous, mental and physical stresses it generates. Every fighting man must be prepared not only to overcome these stresses, but also to preserve a sufficient reserve of moral and physical strength so as to be able to accomplish his military mission fully and achieve absolute victory over his enemy.

The appearance of modern-day matériel, weapons and equipment is increasing these already extreme stresses. The training and indoctrination process naturally becomes a more complex affair as well. Our commanders are nevertheless doing everything possible now, in peacetime training, to anticipate any weakness or deficiency. For the fact is that war will afford no opportunity to remedy training deficiencies. In the course of each period of training they search continuously for the most effective methods to employ in the process of mastering military knowledge and combat skills. They strive, that is, to achieve the best results with the expenditure of the least physical effort, time and material resources and with the maximum acquisition of information and knowledge and development of skills, ability and mastery.

What would be the most basic, the most typical aspects of the training and education process? Let's begin with troop military specialization. Our army's high level of technical equipment and automation of the process of controlling military weapons and equipment are increasingly clearly demonstrating to us that it would today be simply impossible for any of the branches of our service to dispense with a painstaking selection of candidates for any given position. Conditions prevailing in modern-day warfare impose special demands upon the human psyche and practical performance. The

number of the most highly complex instruments and signalling, warning and control devices has increase tens of times. The cockpit of the modern aircraft now contains more than 300 individual control and monitoring components. So just figure out how many by no means simple novel devices are to be found in the typical motorized rifle company! If all its weapons were to be employed simultaneously it would make the untrained, unprepared soldier's head swim. For the fact is that he has to cooperate closely with the machine gunner, the grenade launcher operator, the sniper, the gunner-operator and the infantry combat vehicle driver, not to mention the reinforcement and support specialists.... And to cooperate skillfully and effectively means that the individual must know and take into account the tactical-technical characteristics of his neighbors' weapons and the methods by which they are employed. Even combat exercises involve missions whose accomplishment (monitoring, demonstration, correction in assignments etc.) requires the exertion of a great deal of effort.

So there has been, as you can see, a change in the very psychological structure of the soldier's activity on the battlefield. Here we see a greater role falling to intellectual effort: to the powers of observation, perceptiveness, analysis, correlation and conclusions required to arrive at a correct decision in combat. Particularly at the critical stages. And the individual has to be able to do all this quickly. Very quickly.

Each individual copes with these stresses differently. Practical experience has demonstrated that not just any soldier can be entrusted with any given control position. This requires that we have at our disposal certain psychophysiological data. In the past, for example, we did not take just anybody for pilots or submariners. Now today you don't set just anybody down at a radar screen or the controls of an antitank guided missile. Methods by which trainees are indiscriminately crammed through a course of instruction are altogether harmful and unacceptable.

We begin training our troops for warfare under modern-day conditions from rigorous, scientific specialization. Combat training for specialists with the requisite qualities is, as a rule, a more effective process. They more quickly master their weapons and the skills involved in their practical employment under the most difficult tactical situations.

At this point we cannot go without mentioning another one of the phenomena associated with this approach. Rigorous specialization not only does not dull the interest of a soldier or NCO in his neighbors' weapons, but rather sharpens it! It occurs as no coincidence that socialist competition for mastery of all organic company weapons is now most extensively organized among our troops. Under the guidance and supervision of the commanders involved and in an atmosphere of comradely mutual assistance, the course of this competition will see many of our people develop qualities they had never before noted in themselves. No small number of them then go on to become rated specialists in these "unnatural" or "uncharacteristic" skills. Life is life. It will occasionally add its own fairly substantial corrective inputs into the specialization process. Experienced commanders rigorously take them into account in their work. They see as a result in their subunits greater improvements in performance and, naturally, higher levels of combat readiness as well. In the Guards Motorized Rifle Training Regiment imeni Lenin Komsomol, for example, almost all personnel have mastered the use of a number of types of weapons and are capable of successfully taking the place of a comrade on the battlefield.

So now we have each specialist in the place most appropriate for him. That is, in precisely that position in which he can be most useful in accomplishing combat missions. Everything will now depend upon the professional and methodological mastery and organizational skills of our commanders. The "secret" of the success achieved by our best commanders is simple. Those who are able to accomplish their assigned missions are those who conduct their training personally, who personally undertake the task of instructing the officers, NCOs and rank-and-file troops directly subordinate to themselves. Those who organize their tactical and specialized training so as to exploit to the full the potential, the performance capabilities, built into the military weapons and equipment entrusted to them and to employ them effectively to achieve victory. Those who demonstrate for the level of training of their subordinates the same kind of concern they would show if they were themselves to be leading these men into battle today or tomorrow.

To solve these complex problems we strive to insure that our teaching commanders are able to organize the areas to be covered in training and exercises in the proper sequence and to create conditions to the greatest possible extent approximating with respect to stress and dynamics those of actual combat. Conditions, that is, which will develop creativity and initiative in each individual and contribute to the development of an ability to respond instinctively to a given situation and to find the most effective and advantageous solutions to the problems involved as well as to the development of personal courage, endurance, organizational ability, efficiency and an ability to devise the battlefield strategem. Suvorov's rule will prevail here as everywhere else: learn to beat the enemy not with numbers, but with skill.

We now come to the key question: how do we do all this?

Our best commanders provide the answer. By drawing upon the selfless labors of inventors and rationalizers, they have been able to create a training base of materials, equipment and facilities which makes possible the practical application of the most advanced methods and the achievement of occasionally truly striking successes in the process of training their military specialists and in developing battlefield coordination between their subunits. A leading and organizing force in all their undertakings and examples of enthusiasm and creative searching are their communists and Komsomol members.

What now are the presuppositions, the points of departure for commanders engaged in the process of readying an up-to-date training materials and equipment base for accomplishing the tasks of each individual training period? Combat always means surprises. You can dispose of the most advanced weapons and still come off second-best against an enemy if your will is weak, if your nerves let you down.... The subunit commanded by Captain I. Ivanov had always distinguished itself by its outstanding marksmanship and unfailingly received high ratings in proficiency tests. But none of this really satisfied the officer, so he decided to complicate the conditions in which his men were performing. During the next period of field fire he unexpectedly employed sound and light effects resembling those to be experienced in actual combat. The mission accomplishment percentage fell off sharply. But this did not discourage the commander, and he continued to increase the psychological loads. The soldiers gradually became accustomed to these conditions; they began no longer to react to the annoyances and were soon exceeding even their previous ratings. But their true value was now incomparably higher.

Let us say that objective determination of the fighting efficiency of an individual specialist or of a subunit as a whole is no simple matter. Military theoreticians are going in more and more for modeling combat mathematically. But can they really develop a model of a training process conforming rigorously to the actual mechanisms at work on the battlefield or penetrate the psychology associated with the actions and general behavior of a specialist at a training site under the conditions prevailing in a rapidly changing situation, particularly in one of those "points" encased in armor? In a tank or infantry combat vehicle, for example, where an exercise director has absolutely no possibility of monitoring trainees using the old conventional methods.

The personal experience of our district's skilled experts is evidence that the possibilities here have not yet been ruled out. This involves, of course, taking a creative approach to things and searching for new and more effective ways to provide personnel with up-to-date training and instruction.

We have put together an energetic group of creative people headed by Colonel Vladimir Fedotovitch Blazhchuk, an inventor and rationalizer. He personally has developed a number of unique simulator systems, among which I would point first of all to those designed to provide fire training for infantry combat vehicle crews and tankers, a combination unit for drilling antiaircraft gunners and others. A driving track for the practical training of military drivers in Lieutenant Colonel B. Shevchuk's subunit, the only practice track of its kind, has been developed under Colonel Blazhchuk's direct supervision. Among the novel fruits of engineering thinking placed at the service of our military training program I would also point to a methods-monitoring classroom facility with film projectors and video tape recorders. It permits instructors to view themselves through other eyes, as it were, and with the assistance of more experienced comrades in a relaxed atmosphere to analyze both the positive features and the deficiencies of any given period of instruction given NCOs and rank-and-file personnel.

Blazhchuk's simulators were the first to make it possible to observe with one's own eyes the nature of the interaction between crew members under combat conditions as well as, in a certain sense, their psychological state at critical points in the course of an engagement.

After systematic training in a facility like this there will almost never be any deficiencies to be noted in the handling of weapons and equipment during tactical exercises involving field firing. For the fact is that each error any given specialist makes as his crew as a whole is performing its assigned mission is immediately recorded by sensitive equipment and rectified before it has a chance to take root. So when a crew will be firing live ammunition it is oriented beforehand away from situations leading to errors. That is, it becomes accustomed to functioning under rigorous self-monitoring.

There is now one other circumstance we cannot allow to go unmentioned. If ten or fifteen years ago a training director sitting in his tower had only a very rough idea of what was going on at each of his many training sites and could devote all his attention to only one or two, he is nowadays the true master of the situation. Electronics has now displayed the whole picture before his very eyes, and he can detect errors and deficiencies in the methods being employed by instructors at the various training sites in good time and thus intervene in a timely manner to correct them.

If I were to indicate briefly what constitutes the very heart of an up-to-date program of training and instruction I would say our simulators. They concentrate within themselves the very latest advances in science and technology. The Ministry of Defense is

requiring that we give over the lion's share of our training time to our simulators. This is not only because they make it possible for us to save both time and money, reduce expenditures for motor transport resources, ammunition etc. Today's simulators orient the minds of our specialists in training to the rhythm of events on the modern-day battlefield and train them to act composedly and effectively in stressful situations.

I, a delegate to the 26th CPSU Congress and a military man, have been struck with special force by the words of Comrade Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev: "...the party and the state do not for even a single day lose sight of the need to strengthen the defensive strength of the country and its Armed Forces. The international situation imposes this obligation upon us."

A strong alloy of a high level of technical equipment, military mastery and unshakeable morale--this constitutes the fighting potential of the Soviet Armed Forces.

To continuously increase this potential, to ready our troops to deal a crushing rebuff to an aggressor, to develop in them an ability to deal with any enemy stratagems is our program and the primary task of each day of peacetime combat training.

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GROUND FORCES

NIGHT RECONNAISSANCE TRAINING DESCRIBED

Moscow SOVETSKIY VOIN in Russian No 17, Sep 81 (signed to press 13 Aug 81) p 6

[Article by Senior Lieutenant S. Savin: "Night Search"]

[Text] It was the third day of the exercise. We were about to have to go over to the offensive, but information about the forward edge of the "enemy's" battle area was, alas, unavailable in any great quantity. The "enemy's" good camouflage and security organization had not permitted us to identify his forces precisely. It remained only to approach from the rear, where no one would be expecting us, plot his key strong points on the map and then penetrate his forward edge unnoticed and return to our own lines.

The company commander, Senior Lieutenant A. Perminov, selected his best-trained men for the reconnaissance group and then carefully worked out possible variants of the operation with them. Lieutenant B. Karpenko was put in charge of the group, and I was named his deputy for political affairs.

...So now we formed up in some dense undergrowth. The commander checked the readiness of our equipment and made sure we had all our weapons. One last violet flash of the lantern and the group disappeared into the darkness....

I move out ahead. The attention is sharpened, the body responsive and taut as a bow-string; you feel every muscle, every cell. How familiar, how pleasant this feeling is! I have had to make my way across the taiga and through the mountains many times, and each time the first few steps into the unknown mobilize the organism, adjust for the prolonged period of stress ahead and force you to allot your energies economically.

We passed the first reference point. The road bore close to a pine forest. That's good. We could dissolve into the woods in a instant. Up ahead we started down a gentle slope. This meant we should soon come to a bridge. I remember it clearly from the map. I signal for a halt. Lieutenant Karpenko approaches noiselessly. We have a brief discussion. We decide to cross the bridge in a quick dash. The command is given: "Weapon in hand! Forward!" The wind whistles in our ears. sand under our feet, drops of sweat running down our cheeks.... That's everybody--the bridge is behind us! We move off a little to the side and make our way along a footpath. Now we hear the characteristic crackling in some high-voltage transmission lines; this means we have broken through to the rear. We can halt briefly here. I drop to the fragrant grassy carpet, and only then do I feel how tired I am. But what it must feel like to the other troops! They have not had the experience of putting in three years measuring

off the kilometers across the Yakut and Magadan taiga as I had to do during my time in geodetic surveying before I came in the service.

I look at my watch. It's time to move on. Twenty more poles along the electric-power lines and we'll be approaching an ideal observation point which will permit us to establish the enemy's defense system with certainty.

We set out again, now making our way forward doubly carefully; we stop frequently and flatten ourselves against the ground to wait out another rocket fired out over the forward edge. It's awfully light out here tonight for some reason. It seems like both sides are preparing for a decisive operation. The dark silhouette of a hill suddenly rises up ahead of us. Again we stop. The figure of a reconnaissance man moves out from the group. What's up there at the top? You don't suppose there'd be surprises waiting for us. A low whistle indicates the way is clear.

An impressive picture opens out from the top of the hill. We had assumed the defenses here would be formidable, but I must confess we hadn't expected to see anything like this. Caponier after caponier met the lens of the binoculars. We could make out the massive shapes of powerful machines under camouflage nets everywhere. From time to time the flash of a lantern would tell us that the activity down there didn't fall off for a second.

We have a whispered discussion with the commander. Everything seemed to be clear now; we had plotted out the defensive arrangements. But what was under the camouflage down there? Were these dummies? We had to know for sure.

We silently leave our observation point. We step up the pace a little--it'll be dawn before long. We're already low-crawling most of the way now. We come to one of the caponiers; under the camouflage net--a tank! And then a second, and a third....

Then suddenly against the background of the sky--the distinct figure of a human being. A sentry! We try to blend in with the ground. We had also planned a variant for this turn of events. So now a reconnaissance man creeps toward the motionless figure. After him a second....

A minute or two later they appear with their bundled prize. We now have to start back quickly, before this stirs up the "enemy" camp. We managed to make our way back across the line arbitrarily separating the two sides before the sun came up.

The company commander met us at the command post. Lieutenant Karpenko reported to him the results of our nighttime sortie; they then approached our group together. The commander shook hands all around the group.

Soon thereafter we launched our attack. We won the engagement with high ratings. The command cited our company for obtaining valuable information from reconnaissance, which helped us win one of the top places in socialist competition.

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GROUND FORCES

GERMAN SOURCE ON TANK DEVELOPMENT 1950-1980, PART 2: SUSPENSION SYSTEMS

Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German No 6, Jun 82 pp 324-330

[Text] Part 2. Components Affecting Maneuverability (Continued): Elements of Suspension-Dependent Maneuverability

Suspension

Although tanks having torsion bar spring suspensions already existed at the beginning of World War II (tank III; motor vehicle I), this type of suspension was not able to prevail, as examples of the Sherman tank (wheeled), the Churchill (helical springs) and the T-34 (helical springs; Christie system) have shown. Not until the first postwar generation did the changeover to the torsion bar spring suspension take place in the United States as well as in the Soviet Union.

Great Britain has not used this system to this day; instead, a combination suspension with horizontally placed helical springs (Horstman system) was planned for the Centurion and Chieftain tanks. Just like Great Britain, Israel (Merkava tank) also prefers suspension parts screwed from outside into the side walls of the hull, which has the following advantages over the torsion bar spring suspension:

1. After mine damage, it is easier to replace (according to U.S. reports, some torsion bars had to be blasted out in Vietnam).
2. When the suspension breaks down, the crew is not endangered (from shrapnel, etc.).
3. It provides additional protection on the flanks.
4. It does not require high space (it is noteworthy that, e.g., the Leopard I and AMX 30 tanks with torsion bar suspension are lower than the Centurion and Chieftain!).

In comparison to the simple structure of the tank III suspension, the suspensions of the U.S. M47/48 tanks showed a relatively high degree of

development. Maintenance of the track joints during compression of the first wheel alone is major; Figures 68a and b show the joint between the first wheel and the idler wheel. In addition, these tanks had a track tension wheel between the last road wheel and the gear.

The United States kept the roller track suspension even in the tanks of the first postwar generation. Great Britain also abandoned the Christie suspensions of the Cruiser types which were in use until the end of the Second World War, and designed the Centurion with a roller track suspension. Only the Soviet Union retained the wheeled suspension in its medium tanks. Advantages and disadvantages of both types of suspensions are summarized in Table 14. It shows that the structure of the wheeled suspension is simpler, but that the roller suspension is more advantageous for aerodynamic reasons, especially for tanks having a high degree of maneuverability and heavy weight.

In accordance with the relatively low engine power of the first postwar generation tanks, the total spring travel is only about 150 to 300 mm (Fig. 69).

The majority of the second postwar generation tanks had torsion bar suspensions; the reasons for this were:

1. A high degree of reliability and no need for maintenance.
2. Good material utilization and thus a relatively low weight of springs.
3. The lack of thermal problems.
4. Efficiency achieved through modern manufacturing methods.
5. Economy and low logistical expense during the user phase.

The United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union have made little effort to give their second postwar generation tanks a noticeable increase in maneuverability. Only the Leopard 1 and, to a lesser degree, the AMX 30 tanks showed clearly increased maneuverability on suspension. But especially the Leopard 1 has also shown that the built-in elements and the suspension in many cases no longer permit the full use of the engine strength.

The Leopard 1 shows the level of torsion bar technology which was reached at the beginning of the 1960's: with a maximum torsional angle of approximately 60° and a suspension arm length of 400 mm, a maximum total spring travel of 407 mm could be achieved.

Additional improvements in torsion bar suspension would require the following measures:

1. Increased torsion bar length (not possible because of railroad loading limitations).
2. Longer suspension arms (with the fixed number of road wheels, this would lead to a longer hull and thus an increase in weight).

3. Decrease of the torsion bar diameter (not possible with increased weight).
4. Optimal use of the alloy parts, thermal treatment and mechanical reworking (pre-plastification and surface treatment).
5. Combination with other spring elements (e.g., torsion bar-rotary combination as series).

Certain improvements can therefore be expected primarily from improvements in material selection and manufacturing techniques.

The principle of preplastification (presetting) of torsion bars is comparable to that of the autofregatte process in barrels described earlier: the objective in both processes is a more uniform material wear through residual stress relief of critical zones. The torsion bar-rotary combination does not represent a completely satisfactory solution because only a relatively small amount of the spring work (20 to 23 percent) can be taken over by the torsion bar because of geometric conditions.

The first armored combat vehicle to be equipped in mass production with a hydropneumatic suspension spring was the Swedish 5 tank in 1967. It allows for a tilt of the carriage (and thus the main weapons system) from $+12^\circ$ to -10° (Fig. 7). In spite of the relatively great total spring deflections of up to 540 mm, this battle tank does not move well because of the short length of the track ground contact.

The increase in engine performance in the second postwar generation (10 to 15 kW/t) led to an enlargement of the total spring deflection up to 540 mm (Fig. 69).

During the developmental phase of the interim generation in the 1960's, a few nations made great efforts to get the hydropneumatic spring suspension ready for production; it was expected that this system would bring the following advantages (among others):

1. In comparison with traditional suspension systems, larger spring deflections (Table 15) and increased performance can be achieved.
2. The compact construction of the springs at the side of the hull allows for easy accessibility in assembly and disassembly.
3. The piston hydropneumatic suspension allows for lowering and inclination adjustment of the wheel frame.

First preparations for the use of the hydrop suspension in tracked vehicles were begun as early as 1957 in Germany. It was first used in armored vehicles in 1962 in prototypes of the so-called APC-New, and in 1961 in prototypes of the standard tank of the firm group B (Fig. 72). Spring deflections of 325 mm (APC) or 380 mm (battle tank) were achieved. After abandoning the vertically arranged single piston springs in favor of the horizontally arranged double piston springs, spring deflections of up to

575 mm could be achieved in 1964 in the RU 264 vehicle. (Fig. 73). Although intensive tests have proved the efficiency of the hydrop suspension, they also showed thermal, mechanical and tightness problems, so that this type of spring was not mass-produced as either the APC or the standard battle tank within the prescribed time frame. As already mentioned, starting in 1965, the systematic development of this suspension principle was continued in the United States and in Germany as part of the Battle Tank 70 program; two prototypes of the Leopard 2 battle tank were also equipped with a hydrop suspension. Although the practical design of the springs was much improved, hydrop suspension was not able to reach the stability and duration that the torsion bar suspension is known for.

Probably because of lower requirements, the hydrop suspension went into mass production in 1974 for the gears of the Japanese Type 74 battle tank. Having a total spring suspension of (only) 450 mm, the maximum operation tension for this system is said to be (only) 300 bar, while during the testing of the battle tank 70, maximum pressures of 800 to 900 bar were reached. Parallel to the efforts in Japan and Germany, efforts were also underway in the United States and in Great Britain to achieve hydropneumatic spring suspension for armored combat vehicles. In contrast to the methods pursued in Germany, namely storage of precompressed nitrogen in a plastic bubble--which was often the cause of a breakdown (Fig. 74a)--the springs developed by other nations are supplied with a buffer piston between the oil and gas side. Figure 74b shows the structure of the single piston spring as it is installed, e.g., for testing purposes in the experimental HIMAG carrier. In Great Britain, a single piston spring element in an elongated type of construction (Fig. 74c) is being tested; in the mid 1980's, the planned Challenger battle tank is to be equipped with this hydrop suspension. With a (dynamic) wheel load of approximately 250 kN, a compression of approximately 340 mm is to be achieved; the operational pressure is to be approximately 800 bar. Apparently the hydropneumatic suspension technology still requires some time for development, because even the third postwar generation battle tanks introduced so far (M 1 and Leopard 2) are equipped with torsion bar suspensions, while a hydrop suspension is planned for the battle tanks expected by the mid-1980's (Challenger and STC).

The suspensions of the M 1 and Leopard 2 (Fig. 75) have 14 torsion bar springs to gain maximum efficiency with a given hull length and road wheel diameter. The relatively high spring deflections of these battle tanks--some road wheels have a total spring deflection of more than 500 mm--do not hide the fact that with these suspensions the capacity of the battle tank 70 suspension is not achieved.

The hybrid suspension system of the XM 1 prototype by General Motor possibly represents a compromise solution in terms of costs and capacity. This vehicle had hydrop spring elements in the first, second and sixth road wheel position and a torsion bar and torsion tube suspension on the others (3, 4 and 5).

Damping

The damping system is to deplete the vehicle of energy, reduce vibrations and avoid an amplitude increase of vibrations. This applies to pitching motions, but to a lesser degree also to stroke vibrations.

The first postwar generation battle tanks already show the various types of dampers, although because of low maneuverability of these vehicles only very modest demands were made on the shock absorber system. The Soviet T-54/55 battle tanks had hydraulic rotating dampers on wheels 1 and 5, which were connected to the swing arms of the corresponding wheels with a simple lever system (Fig. 76a). In this battle tank, the entire wheel steering gear could be arranged in a protected spot behind the wheels because of the remarkably short length of the swing arms. Except for the T 64 battle tank, all medium Soviet battle tanks are equipped with hydraulic rotation dampers; in the T-72, they were simply adapted to the enlarged spring deflectors (Fig. 76b). In the Centurion, hydraulic linear shock absorbers were arranged parallel to the coil springs of the front and rear spring elements, while the U.S. battle tanks M 47/48 were equipped with friction dampers. The mechanical friction dampers with constant-damping action (independent of bounce distance or -speed) were quite inefficient, so that with numerous second postwar generation battle tanks, an effort was made to equip them with hydraulic vibration dampers. In the Leopard 1, the development of hydraulic telescope dampers became extremely difficult because of the high mobility of this tank; some of the first hydraulic dampers survived only distances of approximately 5 km in the terrain. For this reason, it was not until 1966 that these elements got into mass production for the second lot.

The damping, dependent on speed, with a damping strength which varies according to the degree of traction and pressure, had some driving dynamic advantages, especially in overly critical driving in (easy) terrain, but the pivoting of the telescope dampers on the wheel swing arms was unsatisfactory: in addition to the limitation of the spring deflection through the available damper lift, there was an undesirable decrease of damping momentum during compression (Fig. 77). In order to avoid these disadvantages, a mechanical disk friction damper has been developed in Germany since 1966, which could be attached around the torsion bar as a rotary damper. This type of damper was used in the prototypes as well as in the production models of the Leopard 2. The damper efficiency, which increases with bounce distance, was to lead to an effective vibration damping even during low compression speeds (e.g., when starting or braking or driving at low speeds off the road); while going fast over unpaved roads, the lower damping work due to lower compression was to result in correspondingly less heating up of the damper. It is interesting that the Leopard 2 is the only armored vehicle having distance-proportioned vibration dampers.

A considerable contribution to suspension-related mobility was achieved at the end of the 1970's through the development of hydraulic bumpstops (Fig. 78) as replacements for the truncated cone springs or experimental plastic buffers used until then. Capacity could be increased from approximately 6,000 Nm (truncated cone springs) to 14,000 Nm (plastic buffers) to approximately

17,000 Nm (hydraulic bumpstops). Since damping efficiency is increased with increased compression speed of the wheel arm, the use of hydraulic bumpstops is an ideal supplement to the disk friction damper, especially in the Leopard 2.

Tracks

In spite of considerably increased demands placed on the tracks of tanks of the last 30 years, there has been no fundamental change in this area since the principles used at the end of World War II. Still at the end of the 1940's, the United States changed in the user phase of the M 26 to the so-called double pin track (Fig. 79a). After this, this type of track was used in all battle tanks of the U.S. Army and the Bundeswehr. Its advantages are a relatively big bearing length of the track bolts inside the pipe and the resulting durability of the elastic bearing between the track bolts and pipes. Based on these characteristics is the use of double pin tracks, especially in battle tanks having a high degree of motorization or great weight.

The classic tank track represents the single pin track (Fig. 79b), which is far simpler in structure than the double pin track and can therefore be produced lighter and cheaper. In addition, wheels in this type of track have fewer vertical vibrations because of the lack of an overflow gap between the tracks. Even if more modern single pin tracks can be equipped with detachable pads and rubber-coated chain bolts, the shorter bearing of the chain bolts results in greater cross area load and thus reduces the durability of the chain bolt bearing. It is therefore understandable that, in the time span under consideration, a number of tank building nations have gotten away from the use of the single pin track and are now using the double pin tracks, e.g., Japan (Type 61 and Type 74); the Soviet Union (T-62 and T-64) and France (AMX 30 and AMX 32). All in all, there is a balanced relationship today concerning the use of both types of chains.

The durability of chains is a decisive factor for logistical reasons. One example is the fact that the Bundeswehr's Leopard 1--even with limits of 1,000 km annually per tank--covers more than 2.4 million "chain kilometers!" In addition to the obvious demand for sufficient durability and safety, there is a secondary demand for longevity and minimal maintenance requirement. With the chains of the M47/48, an average of approximately 1,500 km could be expected (the range was between 100 km and 2,500 km). Chain repair with fully vulcanized tracks was not possible.

Within the second postwar generation, the Leopard 1--because of its high mobility--placed special demands on the strength of the chain bolts and on the durability of the rubbercoating of the pipes (and the rollers). Up until the start of mass-production, no less than nine different types of chains were considered or tested, until finally a type (D 139) which is very similar to the U.S. chain T 97, was selected. But this chain also had to be abandoned after the V profiles were worn; in addition, neither the grip traction in the terrain nor performance in the winter were satisfactory.

For these reasons, the so-called system chains were introduced at the end of the 1960's in German armored vehicles in the Bundeswehr. To increase grip traction, snow grippers and grouser spuds could be used in place of the detachable pads in this chain. The life span of the pads was--depending on terrain conditions--approximately 800 to 3,000 km, while the pipe lasted approximately 6,000 to 2,000 km. The system chain thus had sufficient longevity with reasonable care and maintenance. However, when the weight of the vehicle increased, the chain pitch also had to be increased, so that polygon effects became more pronounced on the deflector roll and driving gear, resulting in increased hull vibrations. An enlarged overflow gap between the individual track links had the same effect. In addition to the requirements already mentioned, an improvement of the "internal quietness" and a reduction of track weight will be of special importance in the future.

In the United States, track development was similar as in the FRG: during the useful life of the second postwar generation tank (M 60), an improved chain type (T 142) with replaceable pads was introduced for this vehicle. With it the chain pipes lasted approximately 4,000 km. In contrast to the German chain development, the U.S. third postwar generation battle tank (M 1) is equipped with a fully covered steel chain, after the parallel development of a light metal chain with replaceable pads was discarded because of its lack of strength. Similar to the fully covered chain of the battle tanks of the first postwar generation, the present-day chain of the M 1 does not last long enough; instead of the approximately 3,200 km required, so far only an average of approximately 1,370 km has been reached.

The Soviet battle tanks of the series T-44/54/55/62 were equipped with metal link joints. Since the bolts--as must be expected--experienced a great deal of wear and this type of chain required a great deal of care and maintenance, a one-bolt chain with rubber joints was introduced in 1977. This type of chain was later also used for the T-72. It is interesting that in the meantime, the T-64 was equipped with a (two-bolt) double pin track.

Driver Seat

In addition to the engine and suspension-related characteristics, the operational equipment and the crew's seating arrangements are significant for the mobility of an armored vehicle. The following observations are limited to the driver's workplace conditions and equipment related to operation.

Figures 80a and c show the driver's seats of the T-54, Leopard 1 and 2; the various timespans within the development and the varying concerns with ergonomical considerations become apparent in the lay-out of the driver seat. The insufficient size of the two periscopes, the impractical arrangement of the instrument panel, the manually operated gear shifts connected with the necessary clutch, and mechanical steering with the two steering levers led to a quick decline in the performance of T-54 drivers. The functional form and arrangement of all signal and operational elements (as much as this is possible in the limited space available) in the Leopard 1 and 2, as well as the large periscope in the Leopard 2, show the importance of ergonomics in

the lay-out of the driver's seat. In addition, because of the reduced operation, upholstery, heating, etc., the driver's capacity is maintained for as long as possible.

Because of the insufficient operational or visibility potential, numerous battle tanks developed during the time under consideration only rarely allowed for the full utilization of the engine strength. This disharmony was especially pronounced in the Leopard 2 prototypes: in spite of an above-average engine performance of close to 22 kW/t (30 hp/t), the driver had only three small 110 x 55 mm periscopes, which had already proven insufficient in the Leopard 1. An additional disadvantage was that many battle tanks did not provide for mirror wiping, so that in damp weather the driver was forced to open the hatch after only a few hundred meters. It is noteworthy that the Soviet tanks of the first postwar generation (T-54/55) were already equipped with washer-wiper devices for both periscopes, as well as a heater to prevent the freezing of water drops.

Clear progress in periscopes was achieved only with the Swedish "S" battle tank; here, the driver has two periscopes of above-average size (400 x 100 mm), which were equipped with windshield wipers. The Chieftain also had a relatively large periscope (field of vision: approximately 100°). Test results from the Leopard 2 prototypes have finally led to a revision of the entire concept and to the installation of larger periscopes (220 x 70 mm).

If one pursues this further, it becomes noticeable that in many of these tanks the capacity to drive in reverse was badly neglected. Especially if used for purposes of defense and delaying actions, the capacity for changing directions quickly is of great tactical significance. Many vehicles of the first and second postwar generation had only one single reverse gear and reached maximum speeds of only 8 to 11 km/h with it; this appears completely insufficient for the reasons mentioned above. Only the Leopard 1 and 2 show improvements in this area; they reached speeds in reverse of 25 and 31 km/h respectively.

Because of the lack of a rear view, the driver of the turret tanks of the past was continuously dependent on the commander. This placed great stress both on the commander and the driver and still led to unsatisfactory performance results. Only after the driver was accommodated in the turret (70), he gained sufficient rear view to enable him to drive independently in reverse without bothering other crew members. But experiences with this type of arrangement have shown that the driver, when turning the turret, instinctively makes a counter movement. This is possibly one of the reasons why the United States, after extensive testing of the 70 and the XM 803, finally placed the driver into the hull again in the M 1. The Swedish "S" represents a special case: since the casemate construction allows for sufficient rear visibility, the third crew member can, if necessary, assume the function of a reverse driver.

Table 14. Comparison Between Wheel Suspension and Roller Suspension Systems

a. Advantages of the Wheel Suspension System:

1. Lack of return wheels including brackets, resulting in logistical advantages.
2. Large track wheel diameter, resulting in lowered roll resistance, improved internal quietness, and protection of roller steering including damping elements behind wheels.
3. Better self-cleaning action of suspension and chain.

b. Advantages of Roller Suspension System:

1. Use of return wheels, resulting in: The upper strand of chain is part of the suspension system, height and diameter of driving gear and idler wheel can be varied, spring deflections can be longer.
2. Smaller wheel diameter, resulting in: decreased weight of wheel and hinge, decreased bending strain of rim of wheel through lateral forces on the track, decreased space requirements for storage and transport (logistics), easier handling for maintenance.
3. Larger number of wheels per meter of ground contact length of track, resulting in: reduced stress on each wheel (advantageous for storage, tire and spring rate), more equal distribution of weight (ground pressure) breakdown of one or two wheels is less damaging.

Fig. 68. Joint between first wheel and guide wheel for maintenance of track tension during compression of first wheel in (a) the M 47, and (b) the M 48.

Fig. 69. Maximum total spring deflections of battle tanks between 1950 and 1980; for legend see Fig. 50.

Fig. 70. The Leopard 1 off road; highly maneuverable battle tanks can use their available engine power only with open hatches because of poor visibility.

Fig. 71. The use of hydropneumatic suspension in the "S" tank to change the tilt of the hull and weapon; notice the large angle of twist of the wheel arms on the first and last wheel.

Fig. 72. (a) Prototype B II 1 of the Standard tank of 1963 with hydrop suspension (vertically arranged single pin spring elements). (b) hydrop-spring elements of the Standard tank prototype B II 1.

Fig 73. Hydrop-suspension of prototype RU 264 (APC New); horizontally arranged double-piston spring elements.

Fig. 74. Hydrop-spring elements.

- (a) Double piston spring element with accumulator bags (Battle tank 70)
- (b) Single-pin spring element with buffer piston between oil and gas sides (HIMAG)
- (c) Single piston spring element with elongated separating piston (Project Challenger)

Table 15. Development of Suspension Systems of Armored Combat Vehicles with Maximum Spring Deflections (in mm).

- (a) Combination suspension: Roller wagen, Horstmann suspension--approximately 250
- (b) Single wheel suspension: Helical spring suspension, Christie system--approximately 200

Belleville spring suspension--approximately 270

Torsion bar suspension, individual torsion bar--less than or equal to 510

Hydropneumatic suspension--less than or equal to 600

Fig. 75. Suspension components of the Leopard 2.

Fig. 76. Hinging of the rotation damper in the swing arms of Soviet battle tanks.

Fig. 77. Shock absorber hinges in the Leopard 1. Notice the decreasing lever during compression damping. Even at constant speeds this leads to a decrease of the damping function by approximately 62 percent.

Fig. 78. Hydraulic bumpstop, installed in the carriage of the Leopard 2 PT 20.

Fig. 79. Principles of construction of tracks: (a) Double-pin track; (b) single-pin track. Notice the varying lengths of track pins in the pipes.

Fig. 80. Driver seats with signal and operational elements and viewers in various battle tanks: (a) T-54; (b) Leopard 1; (c) Leopard 2.

9328

CSO: 1826/44

NAVAL FORCES

TABLE OF CONTENTS: 'MORSKOY SBORNIK' NOV 81

Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian No 11, Nov 81 (signed to press 13 Nov 81)

[TABLE OF CONTENTS "NAVAL DIGEST" No 11, Nov 81 pp 1-2]

[Text] Table of Contents

Reliably Defend the Gains of the Great October 3

IMPLEMENT DECISIONS OF THE 26th CPSU CONGRESS!

I. Uskov. Efficient Training Planning--An Important Way to Increase Combat Readiness 8

E. Zimin. For Good Political Training Results 13

* * *

Yu. Pakhomov, A. Aristov. Assault Force, Go! 18

Navy Chronicle 20

NAVAL ART

G. Kostev. Principles of Naval Theory 24

PARTY POLITICAL WORK AND MILITARY INDOCTRINATION

S. Bystrov. Loyalty to the Navy 30

P. Zaytsev. V. I. and the CPSU on Strengthening Socialist Legality and Law and Order. Set an Examples of Compliance with the Requirements of Soviet Laws and the Military Oath and Regulations 36

COMBAT TRAINING

P. Yarovoy. Together with the Combat Fleet 42

N. Gavrilenko. Competition between Officers: The Promise of Career Development 45

Air Base Address--the Ocean 51

Equipment in Strong and Capable Hands 55

PAGES FROM HISTORY

Defending the Capital	60
The Navy in Combat	66
V. Telyakov. Here We Breathe the Wind of Revolution	67
S. Vishenkov. And Man Found Wings	70
M. Avgustinovich, I. Knyazev and F. Konstantinov. The "Decembrists" Enter Service	72

WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

V. Koryakin. Gyrocompass Technology--The State of the Art	74
Yu. Gorshkov and M. Tsiporukha. Technical Maintenance Equipment and Methods in the U.S. Navy	79

IN FOREIGN NAVIES

E. Mordvintsev. The U.S. Navy's Control System	84
V. Vladimirov. The U.S. "Rapid Deployment Force"	89

CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. Mel'chin. Under the Banners of October	91
V. Sinegubov. Original Edition	93
From Other Journals	94

* * *

New Books	96
-----------------	----

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8963

CSO: 1801/060

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